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INTRODUCTION 
Concern over environmental problems has had a definite impact on 
the policy process in recent years. Government has moved to deal with 
the environment in a variety of ways, and these methods are influenced 
strongly by the demands of interest groups in the policy arena. 
In 1987; the state of Iowa moved to deal with the problem of 
groundwater contaminated by a number of pollutants, the most prominent 
being agricultural chemicals. Concerned legislators drafted the Iowa 
Groundwater Protection Bill, legislation directed towards the cleaning 
up and protection of Iowa's groundwater. The efforts by interest 
groups to influence the outcome of this bill is an interesting study 
into the workings of American Government and Interest Groups. 
Chapter 1 of this paper will try to define interest groups, how 
they are formed, why individuals partake in interest group activities, 
and how they attempt to influence the policy process through lobbying. 
Chapter 2 will nar-row the focus on interest groups to agricultural 
interest groups. A history of agricultural interest groups will be 
provided and a description of how the current farm lobby operates. 
Chapter 4 deals with the emergence of environmental issues into a 
major public policy concern. The chapter will deal with the beginnings 
of the environmentalist movement and the early efforts of the federal 
government in environmental regulation. Current developments in the 
policy area will also be explored. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 will deal with the problem of groundwater 
pollution in Iowa and the efforts of the state to study, document and 
finally deal with the problem with the drafting of the Iowa Groundwater 
Protection Act. Chapter 7 progresses to the legislative battle over 
the bill, with a focus on the lobbying activities of the concerned Iowa 
interest groups. The study concludes with a look at how the 
groundwater bill may have prompted certain Iowa interest groups to 
attempt to influence the 1988 Iowa House of Representatives elections. 
Harold Lasswell once defined politics as "who gets what when, and 
where" (Lasswell 1936). The limits that environmental protection 
places on the economic actions of man requires the state to distribute 
the costs and benefits of exploiting finite natural resources. It is 
evident that certain interest groups, perceiving that they will receive 
fewer benefits or more costs from new governmental environmental 
policy, will mobilize to influence,that legislation in a different 
direction. Their ability to influence legislators will depend on a 
number of factors: their interest group resources, the skill with 
which they lobby the legislature, and the sentiment with which other 
interest groups and the larger body politic view the issue. 
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CHAPTER 1. EXPECTATIONS ABOUT INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE 
The politics of the groundwater bill reflect the group basis of 
political activity. Individuals have needs and goals that they wish to 
obtain from society and will often band together to obtain these 
objectives. David Truman has given us the most widely used definition 
of an interest group: "A group that on the basis of one or more shared 
attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for 
the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behavior that 
are implied by shared attitudes" (Truman 1957, 33). 
Because many needs can be fulfilled through governmental activity, 
it is logical that individuals with similar goals will organize to 
influence governmental decision makers. Collective effort holds many 
advantages for the individual actor in attaining benefits from 
governmental policy. An organized group is best able to translate the 
potential power of a segment of society into. actual power by providing 
a representative entity with which government, politicians, and other 
interest groups are able to deal in seeking support for their own 
activities. Organization also more efficiently channels the efforts of 
its individual units into resources that can directly influence 
governmental policy makers: votes, money, public opinion, and service 
(Holtzman 1966, 4-5). Thus, a segment of interest that is organized 
and cohesive has a major advantage. over other groups that remain 
unorganized. 
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The individual decision to participate in group activity is 
motivated by the desire to obtain certain rewards from efforts within 
the group framework. In James Q. Wilson's Political Organizations, the 
author places these rewards into four categories (Wilson 1973, 36-51). 
The tangible rewards that can be defined in monetary terms are the 
Material Incentives. Some examples of these rewards are wages, 
salaries, profits, fringe benefits, anything that would otherwise have 
to be paid for. 
The intangible benefits which arise out of the act of associating 
Wilson calls Collective Security Benefits. These include the sense of 
belonging and feeling of solidarity that one gains from group activity, 
and also social interaction that takes place at group functions. The 
individual can also achieve a feeling of self-worth from the status 
that the group holds in society. 
Specific Solidarity Benefits are the intangible benefits that can 
be withheld from group members. Specific members of the group are 
often singled out for awards, honors, and deference from other group 
members. 
Purposive Incentives are the concerns and desires that one holds 
for the well-being of the general public. The benefits the group 
member attains from purposive incentives are somewhat indirect, as 
nonmembers are just as likely to share in the fruits of the group's 
efforts. What the group member does earn is a sense of satisfaction at 
having changed society for the better. 
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The issue of interest group participation in the gov~rnmenta1 
process is not a recent phenomenon in American politics. James 
Madison, one of America's "founding fathers", defined interest groups 
in a very negative fashion. Madison wrote: 
"By a faction, I understand a number of 
citizens, wh~ther amounting to a majority or 
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated 
by a common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community" 
(Federalist 10, Berry 1984). 
Modern political scientists have been much kinder to interest 
groups. With the writings of David Truman and other theorists, the 
model of a "pluralist state" began to emerge. In the pluralist model, 
groups act as surrogates for individuals and that "competition among 
interests in and out of government, will produce policies roughly 
responsive to public desires, and no single set of interests will 
dominate" (Loomis and Cig1er 1986, 8). 
While this model has come under much criticism from many 
observers, it seems to hold some merit in helping understand the 
American public policy process. The American political culture and 
governmental structure is favorable to the development of group 
politics. The United States is extre~e1y diverse in ethnic, racial, 
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and religious composition. These cultural ties help create separate 
group identifications within the greater population. 
The freedoms guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution are also 
conducive to group formation. The freedom to organize, the freedom of 
speech, and the freedom of the press are crucial to the organization of 
institutionalized interest groups. The decentralized American power 
structure allows many points of access to interest group pressure 
(Loomis and Cigler 1986, 9). The state and local levels of government 
are prime targets for interest group lobbying. 
The lack of ideology in the political party system in the United 
States benefits interest group activities in many ways. American 
legislators and voters are less ideological than their European 
counterparts, and are not motivated or strongly committed to act on 
ideological grounds (Campbell 1960, 23; Holtzman 1966, 56). This 
characteristic probably makes American legislators more open to 
interest group influence. Jeffrey Berry has commented that a two-party 
system will probably result in ideologically indistinct parties that 
have to address broad constituencies and a broad range of issues. 
With plurality elections in single member 
districts (and thus no proportional 
representation), the likelihood is that there will 
be two very broad parties covering a great deal of 
the ideological ground. To win an election, the 
parties must build a coalition of some breadth, 
attracting large numbers of those in the center 
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("moderates") to go along with those who form the 
ideological core of the party. By their very 
nature, then, American parties are "vote 
maximizers." To win elections, they must dilute 
many policy stands, and generally ignore some, so 
as not to offend segments of the population that 
they need in their coalitions (Berry 1984, 56). 
This gives interest groups a strong advantage in attracting the support 
of many interests that exist in American society. They are much more 
narrowly focused and concentrate more on affecting policy changes than 
on attracting votes (Berry 1984, 47). Thus an individual citizen 
wishing to influence government will find interest group participation 
to be a much more direct and cost-effective means to obtain his 
objectives than participation in the political party structure. 
The size and structure of the American economy is also a factor in 
the large number of interest groups in the United States. Economic 
specialization has created a high level of interdependence in the 
American economy and with this integration comes a greater potential 
for conflict of interest (Salisbury 1969, 3-4). Interdependence makes 
each economic actor more vulnerable to the actions of others, and 
motivates that actor to find means by which to control the outcomes 
that affect his economic well-being. The simple agricultural economy 
of the European middle ages would have had little need for interest 
groups as each farmer or craftsman labored in small, family-run 
enterprises (Loomis and Cig1er 1986~ 6). With the Industrial 
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Revolution, came greater specialization of labor and greater social 
differentiation. Group association is an outgrowth of this process as 
the specialized segments of the economy unite to assert claims on other 
segments of the economy or on the government (Truman 1957, 43). This 
"proliferation hypothesis" links technological change with and changing 
social roles into a greater diversity of interests, with the newly 
differentiated groups desiring a separate agenda of goals (Salisbury 
1969). 
Institutionalized interest groups exist to influence the 
government, and the current proliferation of interest groups can 
probably be traced to the increased governmental role in American 
society that has occurred since the "New Deal" of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt. Beginning with the Roosevelt administration, the American 
public sector began to actively regulate the economic activity of 
American citizens. Government moved to regulate business, agriculture, 
labor, and industry, and created social programs that redistributed 
wealth. The economic benefits government could bestow increased 
considerably. The civil rights movement of the 1960s would also 
involve the government in engineering social change, as the ability to 
influence government social and economic policy became crucial to any 
segment of society's welfare. 
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Lobbying 
Lobbying is how an interest group a~tempts to influence government 
decision makers. An interest group lobbyist can apply pressure 
directly or indirectly. Direct lobbying involves efforts to influence 
the decision maker through direct interaction with an interest group 
representative. Indirect lobbying involves the promise to help win 
elections by helping to muster "grassroots" support among the 
electorate. Of course, the indirect lobbying effort carries the threat 
of an interest group working to defeat a legislator who does not vote 
the way they wish. 
Lobbyists are interest group representatives who serve as 
"transmission belts" of communication between interest groups and 
government decision-makers. What do interest groups wish to achieve 
through this communication process? Political scientist Lewis Froman 
once summarized interest group objectives as channeling communications 
to government, structuring alternative policy choices, acting as 
buffers between government and public opinion, checking the political 
gains of others, providing functional representation, and 
compartmentalizing access to decision makers (Froman 1966, 942-951). 
Their ability to achieve these aims is strongly affected by the 
resources available to each group.' Group resources can be placed in 
four categories. These categories are: 
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1. Physical resources - money and membership size. 
2. Organization resources - membership skills and unity, 
leadership skills, substantive expertise. 
3. Political resources - campaign expertise, knowledge of the 
political process, polLtical reputation and political strategy 
expertise. 
4. Motivat~onal resources - ideological commitment (Ornstein and 
Elder 1978, 69-71). 
Lobbyist-legislator interaction is crucial to the interest group's 
access to government policy making. Interaction involves the 
possibility of modification of another person's behavior through 
. communication and the exchange of benefits and information (Zeigler and 
Bear 1969, 9), Both legislator and lobbyist have goals that they wish 
to achieve in the creation of government policy and they use the 
interaction process to size up each other's objectives. 
Once lobbyists believe that they can influence a legislator's 
decision, they hope to exchange some ~easure of interest group 
resources for the legislator's support for the interest group's 
position. 
Lobbying Strategies 
Lobbying consists of bringing the above-mentioned group resources 
to bear in order to influence government decision makers. A variety of 
strategies can be called upon to obtain this objective, both indirect 
and direct. 
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Indirect strate~ies Indirect methods include letter and 
telegram campaigns, public relation campaigns, and the publishing of 
the legislator's voting record in the media. These methods include 
bringing constituent pressure upon the lawmaker, hoping that the fear 
of losing potential votes will alter legislative behavior. The 
lobbyist is attempting to broaden the conflict and to convince the 
legislator that there are many in the general public who feel the same 
way the lobbyist does and that it would be in the legislator's best 
interest to start dealing with the lobbyist. Interest groups with 
large physical resources would be more likely to use this approach, 
which requires a large membership base. Media campaigns tend to be 
expensive and groups with few financial resources will most likely find 
this approach too costly. 
Most lobbyists rate indirect ·techniques as being less effective 
than direct lobbying. Indirect techniques are considered too diffuse, 
delayed, and hard to measure (Milbraith 1966, 211-212). The 
possibility of reaching a level of participation from the general 
public that would pose a significant threat to an elected official is 
considered to be unlikely. 
Direct strategies Most lobbyists consider direct techniques to 
be the most effective in influencing lawmakers. Direct techniques 
involve personal interaction between lobbyist and legislator. 
Political scientist Lester Milbraith, in his classic The Washington 
Lobbyists, divides direct techniques into three categories, the most 
prominent of which is direct personal communication. This technique 
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involves the presentation of arguments and information directly to the 
lawmaker, through personal conversations, presenting research results, 
and testifying at committee hearings (Milbraith 1963, 353). Lobbyists 
tend to concentrate on the legislature's committee system where they 
can best focus their political and organizational resources (Zeigler 
1964, 162). Key committee members and powerful members of the 
legislature are most often the focus of lobbying efforts. Interest 
groups will often try to select legislative "champions" or legislators 
who are in strong agreement with the interest groups on most issues. 
~ese legislators provide immediate access in exchange for strong 
support from the interest group. 
Since the committee hearing is the principal source of information 
for the average legislator, the lobbyist will offer to give testimony 
at these hearings (Zeigler and Bear 1969, 163). Through these 
presentations or through meeting with individual legislators or groups 
of legislators, the lobbyist will try to convince the legislator of the 
accuracy of the information being presented. 
It is through direct, personal techniques that lobbyists can 
market one of their most important resources--the supply of valuable 
information (Ornstein and Elder 1978, 59). Lobbyists gain access to 
policy makers by providing them with information that can help them 
make policy decisions. They can assist the legis~ator in making policy 
decisions in drawing up policy proposals and pieces of legislation. 
To be successful in gaining access to policy makers, a lobbyist 
has to establish a reputation for providing quality information.' 
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Research and the recruitment of technical expertise are crucial to 
lobbying efforts. The ability to present information which places the 
interest group proposals in a favorable light is of utmost importance 
(Schlozman and Teirney 1986, 289). The lobbyist must be skillful in 
his attempts to persuade the lawmaker that the information is accurate, 
credible, and in the legislator's best interests to consider it when 
making his decision. Lobbyists who rely on the presentation of 
information are generally considered more influential than those who 
are oriented towards pressure tactics (Zeigler and Bear 1969, 125). 
Most lobbying is probably a mixture of both with presentation of 
research findings and other information mixed with some limited 
cajoling. 
The near monopoly that some interest groups have over the credible 
information in some policy area can make them quite potent in mandating 
government policy. The American Medical Association, as an example, 
provides the best and most recent information in their area of 
expertise, health and medicine. The ideal situation for any lobbyist 
is to "create a dependency", where agency officials and legislators are 
dependent on the interest groups for information on a given topic. 
This relationship will over time result in an "issue network" that will 
allow the lobbyist consistent input on the formulation of policy (Berry 
1984, 122). 
While technical expertise is of extreme importance, the successful 
lobbyist must also have political "expertise. The interest group must 
have thorough understanding of the political process and the ability to 
. 
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"zero in" on where the actual political decision making is being done. 
Many interest groups will hire ex-legislators and office holders as 
lobbyists to provide this "inside information" (Mi1braith 1963, 180-
184). The lobbyist must establish a reputation of being politically 
savvy and worthy of trust to obtain access to elected officials, most 
of whom are quite careful about their dealings with special interests 
(Ornstein and Elder 1978, 76). 
Most lobbyists consider direct personal communication to be the 
most effective means to influence lawmakers. Another means of direct 
lobbying is communication through an intermediary. Often this will be 
used when the lines of direct communication are not available. Most 
often lobbyists would prefer this intermediary to be a constituent, 
another legislator, or another lobbyist (Milbraith 1963, 355). The 
lobbyist is usually tryi~g to find someone who has access to the 
legislator, hoping to open the lines of communication or use his 
associate as a proxy in the lobbying effort. 
Milbraith lists the last category of direct lobbying as "keeping 
the lines of communication open". The lobbyist hopes to establish a 
framework within which communication can take place. This can be done 
through a variety of methods, most of which involve the "facilitation 
of communication, rather than· the exchange of information" .(Zeig1er and 
Bear 1969, 192). Lobbyists can provide entertainment and social 
gatherings for legislators. A much more substantial way to achieve 
this goal is to provide campaign contributions. An even more drastic 
and quite risky method would be bribery. It is not often that a 
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lobbyist will resort to such action. Most studies of lobbying have 
suggested that attempts to influence a lawmaker with threats, bribes, 
or favors are usually not successful (Greenwald 1977, 324). Mi1braith 
concluded that the main role of l?bbyists is the presentation of" 
information in a positive light and to provide government officials aid 
with policy proposals (Mi1braith 1963, 159). 
Interest group money mainly goes to incumbent 1egis1a~ors who are 
sympathetic with the interest group's demands (Berry 1984, 170-173). 
An effort to campaign for the defeat of any incumbent is considered to 
be risky and nonproductiv~ by most lobbyists. Lobbyists generally try 
to maintain as much access to governmental decision-makers as possible, 
and targeting someone for defeat does not make a lobbyist appear 
trustworthy in the eyes of the lawmakers the lobbyist is trying to 
influence. 
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CHAPTER 2. AGRICULTURAL INTEREST GROUPS 
In the century fo11o~ing the American Revolution, the U.S. 
population was mostly composed of self-sufficient farmers. With the 
Industrial Revolution, the economy shifted from heavily agricultural to 
industrial. The process of industrialization reduced the amount of 
farmable land and increased the use of machinery in agriculture 
(Zeigler 1964, 166-67). The pattern of self-sufficiency was to be 
broken. Farmers began to produce mainly for profit and then 
specialized in the crops that they produced. The processes of 
commercialization and specialization have had a profound effect on 
American agriculture in the years since the Ci~i1 War. The dramatic 
technological changes that have occurred with the Industrial Revolution 
have resulted in a much more differentiated role for the farmer in the 
American economy. 
Ever since the Civil War, it is quite clear that 
farmers have grown more and more differentiated as 
technical innovations, such as mechanical combines and 
cotton pickers or refrigerated transport, combined with 
other factors, such as the increased use of less 
flexible, arid land, and changing demand patterns in 
both peace and war, to induce each farmer to 
concentrate his resources on the commodity he could 
produce to greatest advantage rather than supply 
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himself with a wide range of necessary food and fibers 
(Salisbury 1969, 3-4). 
With this specialization process came a new interdependence in 
agriculture. Each farmer was now vulnerable to the actions of other 
segments of the economy, banks, railroads, merchants, and others 
(Truman 1957, 87-88). Realizing the need to control these economic 
outcomes, American farmers began to organize to increase bargaining 
ability with competing economic interests. The economic insecurity 
felt by many farmers in the l870s resulted in an era of strongly 
political farm organizations. 
The General Farm Organizations 
The first national farm interest group was the National Grange. 
The Grange rose to prominence in the l870s with strong stands against 
the railroad interest and strong stands for government regulation 
(Browne 1988, 15). The Grange was organized originally in 1867 as a 
fraternal and educational organization concerned with improving crop 
production and providing an active social life for farm families. The 
organization would soon become more political, trying to influence the 
government to regulate railroad freight rates. Grange members would 
often become involved in third-party protest movements that hoped to 
unite the disadvantaged in American society in opposition to the big 
industrialists. The Grange and its much more militant contemporary, 
the National Farm Alliance, actively began cooperative ventures 
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between farmers to eliminate middle-man costs. The Grange reached its 
peak in 1875 with 800,000 members and chapters, in 49 states. 
Grange membership and influence began to decline in the late 
nineteenth century, and other farm protest organizations rose to 
prominence. The National Farmers Union, a direct descendant of the 
National Farm Alliance, was an active farm protest group that 
concentrated on the creation of the Populist Party, an alliance between 
farmers and laborers. The party gained a measure of success in 
attracting voters, but gained little progr~ss in breaking the two-party 
lock on power in the United States. Many other politically oriented 
farm groups rose and fell with the fluctuations·of the farm economy in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
century. Most had one thing in common, the desire to create a third 
party to ?elp protect farm interests. 
The years following the First World War saw some definite changes 
in the farm lobby. The thrust of political activism moved from the 
creation of third parties to attempts at establishing strong working 
relationships with legislators and other policy makers. 
Perhaps the most significant organization from this trend was the 
American Farm Bureau Federation. The origins of the Farm Bureau go 
back to the Morrill Act of 1862, which gave public lands to the states 
for the creation of colleges to teach agricultural methods. These 
institutions soon began doing agricultural research and providing 
educational services for farmers (Block 1960, 10). In 1914, the Smith-' 
Lever Act offered federal grants to states for the purpose of 
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organizing farm bureaus that would act in cooperation with the u.s. 
Department of Agriculture. By 1919, the state bureaus were no longer 
limiting themselves to educational efforts, and were actively helping 
farmers to compete with other economic interests (Zeigler 1964, 177). 
The Farm Bureau was in many ways the product of government 
activity, as Harmon Zeigler explained in his Interest Groups in 
American Society: 
The new organlzation, with the purpose of 
furthering the farmer's economic objectives through the 
influencing of public policy, was not "spontaneous" but 
rather had an evolutionary growth from well-financed, 
governmentally-supported units (Zeigler 1964, 178). 
The organizational structure and technical expertise the Farm 
Bureau had obtained from its origins as a government bureaucracy ai~ed 
in the creation of a very powerful interest group which would become 
the main spokesperson for American agriculture. It had all the 
resources needed for successful lobbying--a large membership spread 
across many states and across party lines, technical expertise, and a 
thorough knowledge of the workings of government. 
By 1943, Farm Bureau membership had overtaken that of the two 
other national farm organizations, the Grange and the National Farmers 
Union (Talbot and Hadwiger 1968, 101-103). The Farm Bureau usually 
attracted large, successful farmers. It was generally thought to 
represent the "upper strata" of American farmers, building alliances 
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with other business organizations, and cool to government interference 
with the farm economy. 
During the Roosevelt "New Deal", the Farm Bureau and the N.F.U. 
would feud over the direction of farm policy, the N.F.U. and the 
Roosevelt Administration supporting programs more favorable to smaller, 
less prosperous farmers. This conflict came to a head with the Brannan 
Plan, a federal price-support plan" that targeted small farmers (Talbot 
and Hadwiger 1968, 193-194; Zeigler 1964, 196). The Farm Bureau and 
the Grange broke with the Roosevelt Administration and have since 
aligned with the Republican Party. The National Farmers Union has 
since become associated with the Democratic Party. These partisan 
differences also carry regional distinctions, with the Farm Bureau 
strong in the Midwest corn and wheat belts and the N.F.U.'s main 
strength being in the South. 
The agricultural lobby in the past few decades reflects serious 
changes that have occurred in the farm economy. The processes of 
consolidation of farms and greater specialization by crop have brought 
a new proliferation of commodity groups into the policy process (Browne 
1988, 20). The general farm organizations still have much influence, 
but cannot be issue-specific enough to satisfy this newly diverse 
constituency. Rapid technological changes in farming methods ~nd the 
increased intrusion of the public sector in the farm economy have 
created several new sets of actors in the agricultural policy process. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE MODERN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY 
William P. Browne, in his Private Interests. Public Policy. and 
American Agriculture, has suggested the use of Tom Veblen's systems 
approach to understanding the American food industry" (see Figure 1). 
Veblen's model divides the actors in the food system into several 
categories, depending on their role as producers, distributors, 
consumers, and other roles in the system. Each segment of this 
progression is institutionally organized and a possible lobbying force. 
A group's position in this complex and diverse economy will affect 
how it will influence governmental decisions. Not all these 
organizations have become active lobbies, while some'have reached a 
level of influence that is much greater than their actual level of 
importance in the farm economy. Browne classifies these groups into 
"active" and "supportive" functions. "Primary", or active groups, 
represent "clear and distinct policy positions of their own choosing. 
These organizations also mounted independent campaigns to influence 
policies that their officials deemed important" (Browne 1988, 28). 
"Supportive" groups generally only lobby through coalitions with the 
primary groups. Often these groups lack the important interest group 
resources to lobby effectively. Note the Veblen diagram includes an 
arrow for government and public interest groups, as these institutions 
have become quite active in influencing American agriculture. Some of 
the more active and influential links of this chain deserve to be 
explored more thoroughly. 
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The primary producers of food and fiber are the commodity 
organizations. These groups include the general farm organizations 
described earlier (Farm Bureau, N.F.U.), and the much more specialized 
commodity groups such as the National Milk Producers Federation and the 
National Association of Wheat Growers. The general farm organizations 
can be considered "multi-commodity" groups as they are composed of 
members of the specialized commodity organizations. The general farm 
organizations are likely to take a "big-picture" view of agricultural 
·po1icy, trying to form broad policy proposals and attempting to form 
coalitions across the spectrum of the agricultural community (Salisbury 
1987, 1219). Commodity groups are well-financed and active in 
promoting the well-being of their constituents by trying to influence 
public policy. One major issue that commodity groups have consistently 
lobbied is the need for the removal of surplus production from the 
market to keep commodity prices high. 
Agribusiness middlemen organizations These are groups of food 
processors and manufacturers. These groups tend to have a much 
narrower agenda than the general farm organizations and the commodity 
groups. Middlemen organizations usually have an issue-specific focus 
on policy decisions that have a direct influence on their constituents. 
Issues of government ~egu1ation of processed food safety, for example, 
and content are a major concern of these organizations. 
Input industry organizations The full-scale commercialization 
of American agriculture has required farmers to purchase large amounts 
of manufactured goods and raw materials to maintain high production 
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levels. These items include farm machinery, fertilizers,. seeds, and 
other raw materials. Support industries make modern, intensive 
agriculture possible and profitable. Input organizations generally 
have a very narrow focus on influencing public policy and are not as 
active as the general farm organizations in influencing governmental 
decisions. As agricultural policy specialist Robert Salisbury noted: 
Specialized producers, with relatively narrow 
policy agendas, tend to avoid becoming embroiled in 
adversarial encounters. As becomes the protagonists in 
a system of distributive politics, they try instead to 
confine their efforts to building whatever support they 
can for their primary policy goals (Salisbury et al. 
1987, 1220). 
With the exception of the general farm organizations, most 
agricultural interest groups keep their policy goals very narrow and 
their efforts confined to specific issues, such as backing government 
programs that attempt to keep commodity prices stable, or working to 
avoid new taxes or governmental regulation that they feel inhibit their 
viability as a profitable industry. 
The Ex-al Coalition 
The above mentioned groups are all similar in one aspect. They 
are all federations of capitalist producers, united mostly by the 
desire for the material benefits that result from interest group 
activism. They may in many instances find themselves in competition, 
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but all agree that the institution of commercial agriculture should be 
promoted and expanded. 
Recent developments have seen the rise of new "public interest 
groups" or the externality/alternative groups. Ex-al groups are a 
reaction against the social and environmental consequences of 
agriculture (Hadwiger 1982, 150-168). The prime motivations for ex-al 
interest group activity are probably purposive and solidary, as one 
receives little material benefit from support of ex-al organizations." 
What motivates ex-al groups to try to influence public policy is the 
desire to see legislation enacted to protect the natural and social 
environment from the damage agricultural methods can inflict. 
The processes of commercialization, specialization, and 
mechanization have increased the toll that farming can take on the 
natural environment. The need to increase the size and quality of 
harvests has prompted farmers to extensive use of fertilizers, 
herbicides, and pesticides, and there is worry that these chemicals can 
cause disease and death among people and animals. The draining of the 
wetlands and the conversion of wilderness to cultivated land can result 
in the extinction of certain species of animal or plant, and the 
destruction of many eco-systems. 
The concern of citizens over the damage to the natural environment 
by agriculture and other industry has resulted in an increase in the 
number and influence of environmentally-oriented pressure groups. 
Three of the largest and most powerful include the Sierra Club, the· 
National Audubon Society, and the Izaak Walton League. 
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While some conservationist groups have existed since the l880s, 
the environmental lobby has seen a growth in size and power over the 
last three decades. This could probably be attributed to the new 
awareness of environmental concerns that higher educational levels and 
increased media attention has given the American public. Another 
phenomenon that has helped in this process is the new political 
activism that arose out of the Civil Rights and anti-war movements of 
the 1960s. Many of the new environmentalists were influenced by the 
liberal activism of the 60s, espousing, as Browne has noted, "neo-
populist beliefs about the need for countervailing political power 
based on citizen input" (B~owne 1988, 135) . 
. Browne describes ex-a1 lobbying as waiting for policy. "windows" or 
times when conditions make reform proposals politically acceptable 
(Browne 1988, 135). Ex-al groups may have strong grassroots support 
and are skillful at exploiting sympathy for their cause in the general 
public and the media. Political scientist Don Hadwiger comments: 
By generating information, imagery, and 
demands for action, the public interest 
groups provide news for the media, mandates 
for agencies and committees, and issues on 
which politicians can assume leadership roles 
(Hadwiger 1982, 157-158), 
Like other interest group lobbies, ex-al groups strive to gain 
access to governmental decision makers by providing the lawmaker with 
credible information that can be used in making policy proposals. 
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Research done by the major environmentalist movement was crucial to the 
implementation of antipollution regulations in the early 1970s. 
It is important to note the major differences between the farm 
organizations and the ex-al groups. The agricultural business groups 
have a shared belief in the benefits of the expansion and continued 
prosperity of the agriculture industry. The ex-al coalition, while not 
hostile to farming, wishes to limit farming methods in various ways 
that could possibly inhibit large scale agriculture. It could be 
stated that the two camps have a "shared disinterest", and end up on 
opposite sides on many environmental issues (Browne 1988, 136; Hadwiger 
1982, 150-168). In a 1987 study of interest group representation, it 
was suggested that farm business groups, especially trade 
organizations, found externality groups to be the one segment of the 
agriculture lobby they would most consider an adversary (Salisbury et 
al. 1987, 1225). 
The growing complexity of agricultural policy and the agricultural 
policy process has prompted the farm business groups to unite in 
informal coalitions that aid in the exchange of information and the 
sharing of the lobbying workload (Browne 1988, 187). The farm business 
organizations can find allies in business lobbies outside agriculture. 
The ex-al groups also have their like-minded allies as in populist 
lobbies that worry over the power of corporate wealth, including labor 
unions, feminists, and other liberal political coalitions. 
Commercial agriculture and environmental concern may not always be 
in conflict, but it is apparent that the two blocs have substantial 
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disagreements on many issues. One of these theaters of conflict is 
groundwater protection legislation. The Iowa bill of 1987 is an 
excellent example of these two sets of organized interests trying to 
influence government policy in different directions. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AWAKENING 
Environmental concern became a strong new issue in American 
politics in the 1960s.and 1970s. In those two volatile decades, the 
conservationist movement evolved from a small number of conservation 
enthusiasts to a powerful political force that wished to make 
significant changes in American society. This movement pressured the 
Federal government into implementing substantial environmental 
protection legislation. 
Why has this policy area come into such prominence in recent 
years? In Walter Rosenbaum's The Politics of Environmental Concern, 
the author explores three major phenomena that help explain this 
awakening of interest in protection of the environment. These 
phenomena are: 
The end of industrialism - On a global level, environmental 
concern is high in developed, industrialized countries and almost 
nonexistent in the underdeveloped Thir~ World. Rosenbaum hypothesizes 
that "in the United States, having arrived at a high plateau of 
economic development, its leaders are free to ponder the environmental 
effects of industrialism and the economic controls necessitated by 
environmental protection without surrendering the benefits of 
industrialization itself" (Rosenbaum 1977, 59-60). 
The changing American power structure - The environmentalist 
movement coincided with some great social upheavals in American 
society. At the same time environmentalism was coming to the 
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forefront, so were the issues of racial and sexual discrimination, the 
protest to end the war in Vietnam, and public outrage over the 
Watergate affair. These national "traumas" may have, at least 
temporarily, broken the monopoly certain traditional interests had on 
governmental decision making. Rosenbaum asserts, "This argument 
asserts that power at most government levels had customarily resided in 
different constellations of private interest, which could force 'non-
decisions' on government" (Rosenbaum 1977, 59-61). The divisive issues 
of the 1960s politicized American society, and led many people to 
interject themselves into issue networks previously dominated by 
private interests. Most of the core of the environmentalist movement 
emerged from the antiwar and civil rights movement, composed of young, 
highly educated college students who had become distrustful of big 
business. These and other "public interest" activists pushed for 
"collective issues", such as environmentalism, at the expense of 
private interests and pressured the government to be more responsive to 
the "public interest" (Rosenbaum 1977, 61-63). 
Reaction to environmental degradation - The environmental 
awakening of the past 30 years could be attributed in part to public 
anger over a number of environmental disasters that have occurred over 
the past 25 years, such as the chemical spill at Love Canal in New York 
or the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969. The public was also alarmed by 
the air pollution problem affecting many American cities. 
Extensive media coverage of environmental disasters has probably 
aided in this new public concern. An excellent example of the media's 
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ability to focus public attention quickly is Rachel Carson's 1963 book 
on the environmental damages of pesticide use, Silent Sprin~ Silent 
Sprin~. This book had a definite impact on attitudes toward 
environmental protection among Americans, both the general public and 
government officials. Frank Graham suggests in his 1970 work on the 
influence of Silent Sprin~ that retrospective studies conclude that 
Silent Sprin~ made large areas of 
government and the public aware for the first 
time of the interrelations of all living 
things and the dependence of each on a 
healthful environment (Graham 1970, 238). 
Membership in environmentalist organizatiqns doubled in the late 
1960s, and on April 22, 1970, the strength of the environmentalist 
movement was demonstrated with "Earth Day", a nation-wide outpouring of 
sentiment for environmental protection. Americans were speaking loudly 
for government action on this issue, and elected officials began to 
listen. In the early 1970s the federal government began to implement 
strong antipollution legislation at a national level. 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
Environmental concern translated into government action with the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). The NEPA required 
all federal agencies to weigh the environmental consequences of their 
actions through "environmental impact statements" that must be issued 
with any federal action that might have a negative impact on the 
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environment. Another provision of· this bill created the· Council of 
Environment Quality,. an advisory body within the executive branch of 
the federal government. 
The Environmental Protection Agency 
President Richard Nixon officially established the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in December of 1970. This action was a product 
of the same wave of environmental concern that helped push through the 
NEPA. The EPA centralized federal antipollution efforts, which had 
been divided among several agencies. The EPA's function is to 
implement congressional antipollution legislation. 
The Air and Water Amendments 
Federal air and water pollution regulations can be divided into 
two distinct.periods, those passed before 1970 and those after, The 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 and the Clean Air Act of 1963 are 
the most note-worthy, but these acts never established a strong federal 
role in the regulation of pollution (Rosenbaum 1977, 138). The pre-
1970 laws were attempts to guide state regulation of pollution 
standards. The federal government considered pollution to be a local 
problem and deferred to the state the authority to enforce the 
provisions of these regulations. Most states were quite reluctant to 
pursue aggressive anti-pollution laws for fear of losing business and 
industry to states more tolerant of polluters. 
In the early 1970s Congress reacted to public pressure for 
environmental protection by passing the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
~ 
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and the Federal Water Pollution Control Acts of 1972. For the first 
time, Congress set rigid compliance requirements to be enforced by the 
EPA. Standards were set for minimum emission and discharge of certain 
pollutants into air and water. The law also included an 18 billion 
dollar grant for states to build water treatment plants. 
The EPA and the clean air and water amendments gave the federal 
government the leadership role in regulating pollution nation-wide. 
Through the rest of the decade, the EPA was active in enforcing 
antipollution standards and pursuing other policies aimed at 
environmental protection. 
New Federalism 
The coming to power of the conservative Reagan administration in 
1980 signaled the end of aggressive federal leadership in antipollution 
efforts. Reagan, a conservative Republican friendly to business 
interests, tried to scale back the federal role in environmental 
regulation. Basic to Reagan's domestic policy was the concept of "New 
Federalism", the return of responsibility for many government programs 
from the federal government to the state governments. The role of the 
EPA was to be redefined as explained in the following agency memo: 
The clear intent of [EPA] policies is to make use 
of federal, state, and local governments in a 
partnership to protect public health and environment. 
State and local governments are expected to assume 
primary responsibility for the implementation of 
33 
environmental programs because they are the best-placed 
to address the specific problems as they arise on a 
day-to-day basis. The EPA role is to provide national 
environmental leadership, .develop general frameworks, 
establish standards required by federal legislation, 
conduct research and national information collection, 
provide technical support for the states, and provi.de 
assistance to states in strengthening their programs 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1988, 184: 20). 
Meanwhile, technological improvements in the detection of 
pollution had begun to dispel previous notions about groundwater. It 
had earlier been assumed that groundwater could not be polluted because 
the soil provided a natural filtration process. Using more 
sophisticated monitoring devices, substantial groundwater pollution 
began to be detected. 
In 1984, the EPA issued a groundwater protection strategy. 
Reflecting the principles of "New Federalism" the strategy places the 
responsibility for groundwater protection in the hands of the states. 
This program provided federal funds for the states to develop new 
groundwater plans. The agency hoped to offer technical assistance to 
the states in deve1Qping groundwater protection plans and to eliminate 
legal barriers to state efforts to combat groundwater pollution. Money 
was not provided for states which had previously instituted groundwater 
protection plans. Money was not provided for implementation. Given 
the lack of a strong federal role on this issue, the state and local 
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governments would be the main policy arena for imposition of 
groundwater protection legislation. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE PROBLEM OF GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN IOWA 
Paul Johnson, who had earlier authored the Iowa Groundwater 
Protection Bill, has remarked on Iowa's groundwater contamination 
problem: "Iowa may have serious groundwater contamination problems 
because so much of Iowa is farmed. Ninety percent of our land is under 
cultivation" (Des Moines Register 2-26-89). Iowa is the most 
intensively agricultural state in the nation, and this agriculture is 
modern, specialized farming that involves extensive application of 
pesticides and herbicides. The major source of groundwater 
contamination in Iowa is agricultural chemicals. Other sources exist, 
like leaking underground fuel tanks and polluted seepage from land 
fills, but farm chemicals, especially pesticides are considered the 
most serious threat to Iowa's groundwater. These chemicals enter the 
underground water supply from several sources. Sinkholes and drainage 
wells allow pesticides in rainwater and runoff to seep underground. 
Abandoned wells, improperly sealed, can channel drainage laced with 
pollutants to enter the ground~ater. 
The use of agricultural chemicals has increased 600 percent over 
the last thirty years (Rajagopol 1984). Application of herbicides, 
pesticides, and fertilizers has resulted in huge increases in farm 
productivity and is considered by most farmers to be crucial to modern 
commercial agriculture. Without these products, a major portion of the 
harvest of certain grains would be lost to weeds, insects, or soil 
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depletion. The production and sale of agricultural chemicals is a 
large industry in Iowa and nationwide. 
Iowa Department of Natural Resources researcher Bernard Hoyer 
noted the unwanted results of the use of agricultural chemicals: 
By 1980, anecdotal evidence of well 
contamination was widespread in Iowa, especially in 
northeast Iowa. Stories from rural residents, 
dairymen, and county sanitarians provided evidence 
of nitrate and bacterial problems in wells, but 
documentation of aquifier contamination by 
agricultural contamination was nonexistent (Hoyer 
1987, 60). 
In 1981, the Iowa Geologic Survey attempted to study the apparent 
problem of groundwater contamination with a focus on ag~icultural 
chemicals. The agency began research in Iowa's largest spring, the Big 
Spring in Clayton County. This project was funded by the EPA, the Iowa 
DNR, and the United States Department of Agriculture-Soil conservation 
Service. The research involved sampling a series of wells and 
analyzing the water quality. The findings from this study supported 
earlier research at the national level that had suggested a link 
between groundwater nitrates and agricultural chemicals (Hoyer, 1987). 
The survey also found earlier generations of persistent pesticides at a 
higher level than had been anticipated. . 
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The linking of groundwater contamination to agricultural chemicals 
was viewed with concern by both government and industry. Medical 
research has suggested that drinking water contaminated with certain 
chemicals can result in a higher incidence of cancer and other health 
problems. Within one year of the Big Spring study, a group of thirteen 
public and private organizations formed the Iowa Consortium on 
Agriculture and Groundwater Quality (ICAG) (Hoyer 1987, 66). The ICAG 
was composed of government" agencies including the Iowa Department of 
Agriculture. It also included some private groups such as the Iowa 
Fertilizer and Chemical Association, which is the trade association for 
agricultural chemical dealers in Iowa. ICAG was established to 
facilitate cooperation between concerned agencies and groups and make 
recommendations on groundwater protection policy. 
In the 1985 legislative session, the Iowa General Assembly 
mandated to the Iowa DNR the development of a state water plan. The 
legislation dealt mainly with water quantity and allocation, but it did 
include language that required the DNR to develop strategies to protect 
the state's groundwater resource. By including this language, the 
General Assembly could have been reacting to several developments 
including: (1) the results of the Big Spring Survey, (2) growing 
constituent concern over the issue, and (3) the 1984 Federal 
Groundwater Protection Strategy, which provides federal funding for the 
development of new state groundwater protection plans. 
George Hallberg of tbe Iowa DNR found a number of factors 
contributing to the drive for some kind of strategy to deal with 
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groundwater pollution. Hallberg notes a strong sense of concern about 
the problem among Iowa residents, and the. very high level of 
cooperation afforded DNR persons researching the problem. Hallberg 
noted that studies in rural sociology have suggested that rural people, 
who are dependent on groundwater for their drinking water and the 
watering of their livestock, do not feel efforts to improve the 
environment should be neglected in favor of economic development (Hoyer 
1987, 8). Hallberg also pointed to the attention given the issue in 
the media, especially the Des Moines Register. The Register ran a 
five-part exclusive series of articles on groundwater pollution in 
early 1986. The Register has the highest circulation of any Iowa 
newspaper and is read state-wide. 
Another factor mentioned by Hallberg is both financial and 
technical support from the EPA. Groundwater was given a higher 
priority in the EPA with the development of "superfund" legislation to 
deal with hazardous wastes. The negative effects of chemical poisoning 
had reached the residents of Love Canal through their drinking water, 
and the 1984 Federal Groundwater Protection Strategy demonstrated the 
new concern with which the issue was viewed at the federal level. 
Further documentation of groundwater contamination was obtained in 
May of 1985, when the DNR conducted an EPA-financed sampling o~ public 
water supplies along the Little Sioux River in northwestern Iowa. 
Twenty-five wells were tested for 64 synthetic organic compounds and 35 
pesticides. The findings of this study were similar to those of the 
earlier Big Spring Survey. Nine of the 25 wells were found to be 
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contaminated with pesticides being the most commonly detected 
contaminants. 
During 1985 and 1986, the DNR evaluated policy proposals for 
groundwater protection. Advisory ·committees were established with 
representatives from all levels of government, members of environmental 
groups, and representatives of business and industry. The DNR sampled 
public opinion with a series of town meetings and a telephone survey. 
The public sentiment sampled by these efforts suggested deep public 
concern for groundwater quality. 
The Big Spring Demonstration Project was established in 1986, an 
interagency cooperative effort developed at the suggestion of the ICAG. 
This project explored the possibility of a voluntary, nonregulatory 
approach to the reduction of groundwater contamination. The project 
sought the cooperation of farmers and other residents of the Big Spring 
area . (Hoyer 1987). 
Research findings from the Little Sioux Basin and other studies 
were to form the basis of the Iowa DNR's Iowa Groundwater Protection 
Strategy submitted to the state legislature in January of 1987. The 
Iowa Groundwater Protection Strategy would form the basis of the Iowa 
Groundwater Protection Bill of 1987. The Groundwater Protection 
Strategy proposed high standards of purity for the state's groundwater 
and set a "non-degradation goal". The goal was to eliminate all future 
contamination of Iowa's groundwater. As stated in the bill, "The goal 
of the state is to prevent further deterioration of the quality of the 
groundwater of the state, and it necessary to restore groundwater to a 
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pre-contaminated state, regardless of present condition, use, or 
characteristics" (Environmental Protection Commission, 1987). 
The bill would allow the Iowa DNR to set regulatory standards that 
are more stringent than federal standards. It was tagged House File-
631, debated in both houses of the state legislature, and passed in 
April of 1987. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE IOWA GROUNDWATER PROTECTION ACT 
The Iowa Groundwater Protection Act was enacted on July 1, 1987. 
The goal of the act "is to prevent contamination of groundwater from 
point and nonpoint sources to the maximum extent practical, and if 
necessary to restore the groundwater to a potable state, regardless of 
present condition, use or characteristics" (Environmental Protection 
Commission, 1987). 
The act approaches this goal with an eye toward educating society 
on the dange~ of groundwater pollution and funding research to cembat 
the problem. The act establishes two new research centers; one center 
is the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture at Iowa State 
University in Ames and the other center is the Center for Health 
Effects of Environmental Contamination at the University of Iowa in 
Iowa City. Both institutions are charged with the tasks of researching 
the environmental effects of groundwater pollution and to assist in the 
development of alternatives to the current methods of chemical 
management. The cost of researching this problem is estimated, in the 
bill, at six million dollars. 
Several provisions of the act address education; these include the 
topic of water quality to be included in the curriculum of public 
schools. and local agencies will cooperate with the Department of 
Natural Resources in the dissemination of information on water quality. 
The act requires pesticide applicators to attend classes on safe 
application and to pass a written exam. 
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While the act's emphasis is on education, it is not completely 
devoid of regulation. Regulations in the act are: (1) tougher 
regulation of landfills, (2) regulation requiring the plugging of 
abandoned wells, (3) permits for the drilling of new wells, (4) 
adoption of groundwater protection strategies by all counties, (5) the 
requirement of a permit for dumping on any land, and (6) regulation of 
minimum standards for all underground storage tanks. The most 
controversial aspect of the act is the question of who will pay to 
finance its implementation. The Iowa Groundwater Protection Act 
requires $60 million dollars, and all but 17.5 million (the State of 
Iowa committed this sum from an oil overcharge fund) will be provided 
by fees on the producers of pollutants. Approximately 20 million 
dollars will come from agricultural sources. An increase in pesticide 
retailer fees and product registration fees for chemical manufacturers 
will provide about $17.5 million, with a tax on nitrogen fertilizers 
making up the rest. 
But how did this landmark legislation move from the DNR to House 
File-631 to the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act? The efforts by 
certain elected officials and interest groups in pushing through the 
bill was met by a counter-force of equally-committed opponents of HF-
631. The struggle over groundwat~r protection in a small Midwestern 
state is a fascinating study in interest groups and the politics of 
environmental degradation. 
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CHAPTER 7. THE LEGISLATIVE BATTLE OVER HF-63l 
In studying the battle over the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act, 
the most informative source for information was interviews with the 
major political actors. Most of the information of this description 
has been obtained by interviews with legislators, lobbyists both for 
and against the passage of the groundwater bill, DNR personnel who were 
influential in drawing up the bill, and private citizens concerned with 
the issue. 
Interview subjects were asked to give their impressions on the 
passage of the groundwater bill, and to comment on the political 
actions of concerned groups and individuals. Those interviewed also 
provided literature that provided insight into the passage of the 
groundwater bill and the problem of groundwater contamination in Iowa. 
The Iowa Groundwater Protection Act was heavily debated in both 
House and Senate in late March and early April of 1987. It passed 
through Senate and House committees and was voted into law with a large 
plurality. 
The bill was introduced and strongly lobbied by a group of 
environmentally concerned legislators that will be referred to as the 
"key six". They were supported by representatives of Iowa's largest 
environmental groups. Opposition to the bill came primarily from the 
Iowa Fertilizer and Chemical Association (IFCA), a trade organization 
composed of dealers of pesticides, herbicides and fertilizers. The 
IFCA sent lobbyists to the statehouse to defeat the bill. Other groups 
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that lobbied to defeat or "water down" the bill were the Iowa Farm 
Bureau Federation (IFBF) and the state's major commodity groups. 
The Iowa Groundwater Protection Act was based on the principles of 
the Iowa Groundwater Strategy and introduced in a bill co-authored in 
the Iowa House of Representatives by Representatives Paul Johnson and 
David Osterberg. Johnson and Osterberg, along with four other 
legislators, would compose a group dubbed the "key six" who would be 
the main prop?nents and lobbyists behind the bill. DNR personnel 
lobbied for HF-631, and testified at the hearings to defend the DNR 
research forming the basis of the bill. Opponents of the bill lobbied 
to defeat the bill, or at least "water down" some of its proposals with 
amendments. 
A total of 23 pages of amendments were proposed to amend HF-631. 
The major points of contention can be explored here. 
The issue of proposed standards of purity of groundwater was a 
focus of much debate. The Iowa Groundwater Protection Strategy called 
for a "non-degradation goal", a long term goal to eliminate all 
groundwater pollution. Opponents of this provision proposed several 
amendments to change the language of the bill. Senator Tabor proposed 
replacing the non-degradation provision with the "Illinois Language" 
which states "no unreasonable pollutant shall be allowed." This change 
would have allowed for some level of pollution in Iowa's groundwater. 
Another proposal called for the .Iowa standards of purity to be 
consistent with EPA groundwater pollution standards. HF-631 allowed 
Iowa to exceed federal standards. The issue was left unresolved by the 
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groundwater bill with final passage, the final language of which states 
that "adopting health-related groundwater _standards may be of benefit 
in the overall groundwater or other regulatory efforts of the state. 
However, the existence of such standards, or lack of them, shall not be 
construed in degradation of the groundwater protection goal and 
protection policies of the state" (Environmental Protection Commission, 
1987). 
Establishment of the Agriculture Management Account to finance the 
provisions of the bill was opposed by legislators and lobbyists who 
claimed the expense to individual farmers or pesticide retailers was 
much too high. Most of the funding sources prescribed in the bill were 
left intact. The use of the oil-overcharge account funding helped 
lessen initial costs to Iowa's agricultural sector. 
The issue of individual pesticide applicator liability was lobbied 
heavily by the Farm Bureau and this effort was successful. The act 
protects applicators who followed label directions from liability for 
cleanup costs. 
Under the provisions of the bill, abandoned water wells must be 
plugged, and existing drainage wells must be closed by 1992. Critics 
of this provision pointed out that many areas of northern Iowa are 
drained by these-wells, and farmland would revert to wetland without 
them. Alternative drainage methods also tend to be expensive. Under 
the act that was passed, abandoned wells must still be plugged, but the 
section requiring closure of Agricultural drainage wells was modified 
somewhat. The act now requires agricultural drainage wells (ADWs) to 
46 
be registered with the state and establishes a long-range plan to find 
alternatives to ADWs by 1995. 
Proponents of the bill were unable to include a new 4 percent tax 
on hazardous household wastes. The bill still does provide funds for 
hazardous household waste cleanup days where citizens, with state 
assistance, can dispose of their household wastes without dumping them 
directly in the landfill. Hazardous wastes leaking from landfills are 
believed to contribute directly to groundwater contamination. 
Supporters of the bill had hoped the tax would help clean up state 
landfills and direct citizens away from the use of hazardous chemicals. 
Opponents claimed the tax was too high and that few people participate 
in household cleanup days. 
Sue Mullins, a Republican "key six" legislator, felt that most of 
the attempts at "watering down HF-631 occurred in the Senate, and were 
undertaken by a group of senators, mostly Republican, who are "tight 
with chemical money (Mullins 4-13-89)". Proponents of the bill pointed 
to the Senate version of the bill as being less committed to the 
principles of the Iowa Groundwater Protection Strategy. 
Mullins, who had been minority leader on the House Agriculture 
Committee, had to fight a move by some Republicans to remove her from 
the conference committee that hammered out the differences in the House 
and Senate versions. Winton Etchin of the IFCA does suggest fertilizer 
industry unhappiness with the composition of the committees in the 
house .. "The Committees were chaired by people unfriendly to us who did 
not want us to be heard" (Etchin 2-24-89). Mullins suggests the 
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opponents of HF-63l wished the first conferenc·e committee to fail so 
new committee assignments could be made bringing representatives less 
sympathetic to groundwater protection to the forefront. However, "key 
six" legislators feel the bill survived the conference committee 
without losing most of the important points. David Osterberg states 
the bill is the "best in the nation" and that it "does exactly what it 
is supposed to do ... " (Osterberg 2-24-89). 
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CHAPTER 8. POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE GROUNDWATER BATTLE 
AND THEIR OBJECTIVES 
Iowa State Legislators - The driving force behind the passage of 
HF-63l were a number of Iowa State Legislators. Paul Johnson (D-
Decorah) and Doug Osterberg (D-Mount Vernon) co-authored the bill, and 
were in close cooperation with Representatives Ralph Rosenberg (D-Ames) 
and Jack Hatch (D-Des Moines). Also included in this group are House 
Speaker Don Avenson (D-Oelwein) and Sue Mullins (R-Corwith), who was 
minority leader of the House Agricultural Committee. These six 
legislators helped translate the Iowa Groundwater Protection Strategy 
into a policy proposal and push it through to passage in the house. 
The bill became so identified with the "key six" legislators, that 
after the bill's passage, the chief lobbyist for the Iowa Fertilizer 
and Chemical Association, Winton Etchon, urged the IFCA and fertilizer 
dealers to work for their defeat. 
Interviews with the "group of six" suggests they share deep 
environmental concern and "agree on many social issues as well. Jack 
Hatch notes that he and several other of the main proponents came of 
age in the late 1960 period of environmental activism. "All of us came 
of age in the sixties and seventies, our socialization came at the same 
time as Earth Day and Rachel Carson, we are children of that era and we 
never lost it" (Hatch 3-3-89). Representative Ralph Rosenberg saw HF-
631 as being based on the shared ethic of "stewardship" or preserving 
the quality of the environment for future generations to enjoy 
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(Rosenberg 4-7-89). Rosenberg, who has been proposing environmental 
protection legislation in the Iowa House since 1983, affirmed that the 
states need to "step in where the (federal) executive branch is 
neglecting" (Rosenberg 4-7-89), and be the main policy initiators for 
environmental protection. 
Concern was also voiced among proponents of the bill about the 
long and short term health effects of agriculturql chemicals upon the 
people of Iowa. Sue Mullins saw her support of HF-63l as being tied in 
with her concern for health issues (Mullins 4-13-89). Mullins, whose 
district has numerous agricultural drainage wells, hoped that the 
research-and-education-oriented bill would give her constituents a 
chance to deal with ADW problem without strict new regulations from the 
state. 
Rep. David Osterberg said that groundwater pollution is a serious 
threat to Iowa's health, and points to several incidents of health 
problems across the state that may have been caused by agricultural 
chemicals in the groundwater. In Osterberg's home district, cattle in 
the town of Holy Cross had begun to die from what Osterberg believes is 
contaminated water. He hoped that "by acting quickly, we can avoid 
some serious health problems ..... (Osterberg 2-24-89). 
Many.of the six main pr~ponents of the bill express distrust of 
business interests in the area of dealing with pollution. When asked 
about the chemical industry lobbying effort over HF-63l, Rep. Hatch saw 
it as a contest between "what's good for' people versus what's good for 
so 
business ... " He added, "They [the chemical lobby] chose what's good 
for business and they lost" (Hatch 3-3-89). 
For a number of reasons, including environmental sentiment and 
constituent concern, six Iowa House Representatives made a strong and 
concerted effort to bring an· important piece of groundwater protection 
legislation to passage. They authored the bill, argued its passage on 
the House floor, and were instrumental in its passage. Other 
legislators are mentioned when observers discuss the introduction and 
passage of HF-631, but the "key six" consistently appear as the main 
driving force behind the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act. 
The Pesticide and F~rtilizer Industry 
The provisions of the groundwater bill would affect the well-being 
of the chemical and fertilizer industry more than any other sector ?f 
the farm economy. The bill provides new taxes and regulations that 
could reduce the size and profitability of the agricultural chemical 
industry. Opposition to HF-63l came from both the Iowa Fertilizer and 
Chemical Association (IFCA) and from national manufacturers of 
agricultural chemicals such as the Dow and Monsanto chemical companies. 
Industry objectives for groundwater legislation, as told by 
several industry officials and lobbyists are, in the short term, to 
avoid the new expenses and regulation that HF-631 includes, and in the 
long term, to preserve the viability of the agricultural chemicals 
industry. 
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While the provisions of HF-63l would cost the industry from three 
to five million dollars (Etchin 2-24-89), probably the chief motivation 
for the IFCA's aggressive lobbying effort was long-term concern over 
the future of their industry in the face of new environmental 
legislation. 
The industry clearly felt that the groundwater bill was the first 
attempt by environmentalist legislators to reduce and ultimately 
eliminate the use of agricultural chemicals. 
Dr. Richard Fawcett, and ex-IFCA board member, states that since 
the main proponents of the bill b~lieve that all pesticides are 
leeching into the groundwater from regular use, the next logical step 
for them would be to try to eliminate the use of pesticides completely 
(Fawcett 3-3-89). 
IFCA leaders note that the Leopold Center for Sustainable 
Agriculture is charged with conducting research on alternatives to the 
use of pesticides and fertilizers. The concept of "organic farming" or 
farming without the use of synthetic chemicals is popular among many 
environmentalists, and is seen as a threat by most chemical dealers. 
Representative David Osterberg, who strongly advocates a substantial 
reduction in the use of chemicals, suggested the fertilizer lobby does 
not want farmers to "look twice at the use of chemicals and 
fertilizers ... and fear the state being able to spend some money to look 
at alternatives to the use of more and more chemicals" (Osterberg 2-24-
89). 
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"The IFCA disagreed with the bill's presumption of the dangers of 
agricultural chemicals in groundwater, and of the identification of 
agricultural chemicals as the main source of pollution in Iowa's 
groundwater. Industry officials claim the research done by the Iowa 
DNR conducted on the state's groundwater supply did not prove a link 
between agricultural chemicals and " groundwater contamination, and that 
there is no conclusive proof that certain pesticides, herbicides, or 
fertilizers mentioned in the DNR study are harmful to human health 
(Etchin 2-24-89). 
Winton Etchin, chief lobbyist for the IFCA, wonders why 
agricultural chem~cals have been singled out for regulation when 
pollution from industrial sources is in his view far more serious. He 
asked, "Why is the state out swatting ants when the elephants are 
running wild?" (Etchin 2-24-89). Etchin expr~ssed industry resentment 
that the IFCA is not to be represented on the boards of the centers of 
research created by the law, even though the fertilizer industry is 
being charged 5 million dollars to support these institutions. 
National chemical manufacturers had two objectives in mind in 
lobbying the bill. As specified by Dr. Fuggett of National 
Agricultural Chemicals they are: 
1. The national manufacturers, such as the Dow and Monsanto 
chemical companies, hoped to influence the Iowa legislature to include 
standards of toxicity that would allow some level of pollution in the 
state's groundwater. The chemical industry as a whole was quite 
critical of the bill's "non-degradation goal". 
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2. The major chemical manufacturers were also concerned with the 
issue of liability for the costs of contamination sites. They lobbied 
heavily to avoid provisions in the bill which made the manufacturer 
liable for the cost of cleaning up groundwater polluted by chemicals 
purchased from chemical manufacturers (Fuggett 4-10-89). 
Iowa externalities-alternative groups Three major 
environmental groups were mentioned as being active players in the 
lobbying effort for passage of the bill. They are the Sierra Club, the 
Audubon Council, and the Izaak Walton League. Iowa's ex-al groups, 
state and local chapters of national environmentalist organizations, 
are not considered to be very well financed or organized. Their 
membership is composed of a relatively small number of activists acting 
out of personal concern for environmental issues. 
The provisions of HF-63l were quite compatible with the 
environmental objectives of these groups and they welcomed its 
introduction and passage. Environmental groups felt little progress 
would be achieved for environmental protection nationally under the 
conservative Reagan Administration. The focus of environmental 
activism may have shifted to efforts to influence state regulation of 
pollution such as the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act. 
All three of Iowa's significant environmental groups expressed 
strong support of the bill. They believe groundwater contamination is 
a serious problem which could reach a crisis situation in the near 
future. While 'the environmental groups did not set the agenda for HF-
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631, they were strong advocates of the bill mobilizing interest group 
resources to fight for its passage. 
While the environmental groups were comfortable with HF-63l, they 
worried about the bill becoming "watered down" by the demands of t~e 
political process. They hoped to playa "watchdog" role, using their 
interest group resources to try to maintain the provisions of the bill 
they considered to be most crucial to combatting groundwater pollution. 
Two major components of HF-631 lobbied heavily by environmental groups 
were the maintenance of the bill's "nondegradation goal" and the 
assignment of a funding source that provides both money for researching 
the problem and penalties for polluters. 
Environmental groups endorsed the bill's "non-degradation goal" 
with much enthusiasm. In an Audubon Council memo, environmental 
activist Cindy Hildebrand wrote, "Given our incomplete knowledge of the 
effects of individual contaminants and combination of contaminants, and 
given the expense of cleaning up polluted groundwater, Iowa's proposed 
code goal of preventing further contamination of the quality of the 
groundwater in the state is well-justified" (Hildebrand, Iowa Audubon 
Council Memo, C.A., 1988). Environmentalists worried about the 
imposition of standards that would allow continued pollution of 
groundwater at a lower level. Tolerance of a certain level of 
pollution would allow new pollutants in areas that have a contamination 
level below an established standard. 
Cindy Hildebrand of the Audubon Society noted how the Iowa 
environmental group~ considered the assignment of a funding source for 
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the provisions of the groundwater bill to be important (Hildebrand 4-5-
89). Hildebrand hoped the major financial burden of funding HF-63l 
would fallon the parties who are polluting. This founding source not 
only provides funding for research and education, but also provides a 
deterrent from further polluting. Chris Robbins, in a Sierra Club 
"Legislative Alert" wrote, "HF-631 represents sound economics. It 
raises money to fight pollution from the sources of pollution. Taxes 
and fees on hazardous material will discourage overuse of those 
materials" (Sierra Club, Iowa chapter, Cedar Prairie Group, Legislative 
Alert 1987). 
Agricultural Interest Groups 
"Iowa Farm Bureau Federation The Farm Bureau is considered by 
both Democratic and Republican staff at the Iowa Statehouse to be the 
largest and most powerful agricultural interest group in Iowa. 
The Bureau preferred the educational and research approach in 
combatting the problem of groundwater contamination. Spokesman Ted 
Yanochek said the IFBF is quite comfortable with the establishment of 
the groundwater research centers and the tougher licensing requirements 
for pesticide applicators and did not lobby to defeat these provisions 
of the bill (Yanochek 3-9-89). 
The primary objectives of the Farm Bureau with regard to HF-631 
were to lessen the costs of groundwater clean-up for the individual 
farmer. The issue of strongest importance was ~he protection of 
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individual farmers from liability costs for the clean up of polluted 
groundwater. 
Farm Bureau lobbying also centered on the issue of agricultural 
drainage wells, hoping to avoid tougher regulations that would strongly 
affect farmers in north-central Iowa. As IFBF spokesmen Richard Naeve 
testified at a House hearing. in March 1987, "The legislators must 
recognize that by simply outlawing the use of drainage wells, extreme 
hardship may result, less drastic courses of action should be 
investigated" (Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, Spokesmen 3-21-87). 
Commodity groups Iowa's four largest commodity groups, the 
Iowa Pork Producers, the Iowa Soybean Association, the Iowa 
Corngrowers, and the Iowa Cattlemen's Association share a communal 
lobbyist who is permanently stationed at the statehouse to express 
commodity group concerns to the state legislature. 
Commodity group lobbying on HF-63l was quite limited,"because 
these groups tend to be interested in issues more specific to their 
particular interests. David Larson of the Iowa Soybean Association 
explained that his organization is more of an "association" than a 
lobby and generally defers to the Farm Bureau on issues of a more 
political nature (Larson 5-1-89). 
On the issue of groundwater pollution, commodity groups expressed 
the need to balance the protection of their production resources 
(water, soil, air) with the need to maintain profitability. Continued 
contamination of the groundwater with which Iowa's producers water 
their livestock and crops is seen as a serious threat, but the cost of 
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dealing with this problem would be financed partly from Iowa's producer 
industries. 
Commodity group leaders feel that the research documenting the 
problem is not yet complete and they support the research and 
educational aspects of the bill. Larson strongly supports tougher 
licensing requirements for pesticide applicators, and most commodity 
groups prefer more demonstration projects like the Big Springs effort. 
The producer organizations would not have been as comfortable with a 
more regulatory bill, which they feel would have been based on 
incomplete data. For the same reason, David Larson of the Soybean 
Producers would not have supported the introduction of standards of 
toxicity into the bill. 
Maynard James, head of the Iowa Cattlemen's Association, stated 
that his organization did not consider the issue of groundwater 
pollution to be relevant to the beef industry (James 5-2-89). James 
feels that the beef industry is more threatened by environmental 
protection regulation that might block access for watering cattle at 
streams or the acquisition of grazing land for conservational use. 
James suggests that the Cattlemen's Association is probably more 
responsive to proposals for environmental protection because his 
industry is less detrimental to soil and water resources than the row-
cropping industries, such as those based on corn or soybean. He sees 
the possibility of the cattlemen building bridges to Iowa ex-al groups 
in the future, especially on the issue of soil conservation. He 
explained, "Our idea of soil conservation is a grass-covered hill with 
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a cow running across it" (James 5-2-89). The Cattlemen's Association 
did not see a coincidence of interest with the chemical industry or the 
row-cropping commodity groups· on the groundwater bill and did not take 
an active part in the lobbying effort. 
Clearly Iowa's commodity groups did not feel threatened by HF-631. 
As long as the bill approached the issue with a mostly educational and 
research approach, the major commodity groups did not actively oppose 
its passage. 
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CHAPTER 9. THE LOBBYING EFFORT 
The debate in the Iowa House and Senate over the groundwater bill 
was the subject of much lobbying by interest groups. Interest group 
lobbyists came to the Iowa state capitol in Des Moines to monitor the 
debate on the House and Senate floor, meet with legislators to discuss 
their concerns, and to testify at the House and Senate hearings. 
The issue of groundwater pollution is a very complex topic on 
which few legislators were very knowledgeable. The main source of 
information for·most of the legislators was the House and Senate 
hearings that discussed the topic of groundwater contamination. 
Lobbyists for both sides presented research findings and information at 
these hearings. 
Lobbying in support of the bill was mostly done by the "key six" 
legislators with some help from Iowa ex-al. groups. DNR personnel 
testified at hearings to defend the research that formed the basis of 
the groundwater bill. 
Lobbying strongly against the bill was the Iowa Fertilizer and 
Chemical Association along with lobbyists dispatched to Iowa from 
national chemical manufacturers such as Dow, Monsanto, and others. The 
Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and the major Iowa commodity groups also 
lobbied certain provisions· of HF-63l. 
Group Lobbying on HF-63l 
IFCA lobbying The Iowa Fertilizer and Chemical Association 
lobbied heavily to defeat·or seriously "water down" the Iowa 
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Groundwater Protection Act. The IFCA strategy was in two parts, to 
find alternative sources of technical information to contradict DNR 
research findings and some direct pressure on state legislators from 
fertilizer dealers and farmers. 
IFCA lobbyists attended the House and Senate hearings and 
presented research findings to state legislators. An important source 
of alternative information on which they relied is Dr. Richard Fawcett, 
an Iowa State University professor of etomology. Fawcett was highly 
critical of the Iowa Groundwater Protection Strategy and of the bill in 
general. He claims the authors of the bill did not conduct any 
alternative research to the findings of the DNR studies. He said, 
"They only listened to the DNR and disregarded everyone else" (Fawcett 
3-3-89). 
Fawcett's findings are quite different from the research forming 
the basis of the Iowa Groundwater Pro~ection Strategy. He explained: 
"In my opinion, many misconceptions exist about how pesticides can 
contaminate groundwater. These misconceptions may have a harmful 
effect on efforts to protect groundwater." Fawcett does not think 
normal use of pesticides causes the groundwater pollution problem: "It 
is my scientific opinion that leeching with normal use does not 
ordinarily cause measurable contamination of wells ... ," and "Reductions 
in the amount of chemicals applied should not be expected to have 
measurable positive impact on groundwater quality, if leeching with 
normal use is not the most important mechanism of contamination for 
most pesticides used in Iowa" (Fawcett 1988). He points to an Illinois 
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study in 1984 which supports his findings that agricultural chemicals 
enter the groundwater only whe~ the soil·is very sandy or the pesticide 
has been applied in very high concentration, much higher than with 
normal use. 
Dr. Fawcett, an IFCA board member and ISU extension employee, was 
not allowed to testify at the House or Senate hearings, but says he 
provided information and training with which IFCA lobbyists were able 
to lobby the bill. 
IFCA lobbyists did not limit themselves to the presentation of 
supportive research findings. In mid-March 400 IFCA members converged 
on the Iowa State capitol to express their concerns. Fertilizer 
dealers were encouraged to contact their state representatives and 
lobby against HF-63l. Some critics suggest the IFCA conducted an 
intense pressure campaign against the bill. Chris Robbins of the 
Sierra Club remembered meeting individual farmers and hearing them 
speak out against the bill with the same "canned answers", which she 
suggested were provided by IFCA lobbyists attempting to mobilize 
opposition to the bill at the grassroots level (Robbins 4-13-89). 
Several of the "key six" expressed sentiment that the IFCA was out to 
convince legislators to defeat the bill with misinformation and threats 
to defeat these legislators in the next election. 
National chemical companies flew in technical advisors and experts 
to Iowa to monitor the situation and do some lobbying. The Iowa bill 
was on the cutting edge of a national trend and the major chemical 
companies considered the Iowa bill to be a test case for future 
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legislation. Manufacturers provided some technical and research help 
to the IFCA (Etchin 2-24-89). The national manufacturers organized a 
meeting with ex-al groups that Chris Robbins of the Sierra Club says 
could have been to "size up the opposition for the future" (Robbins, 
1989). 
Dr. Robert Fuggett of the National Agricultural Che~icals 
Assoctation, a trade association of the large pesticide and herbicide 
manufacturers, was one of these outside experts. Fuggett saw his role 
as a technical advisor to chemical industry lobbyists. Fuggett and the 
national chemical lobby attempted to get standards of toxicity 
introduced in the Iowa bill. "The Iowa bill was an absolutist bill 
which is not practical in today's day and age. Man cannot live on this 
ear~h without making footprints" (Fuggett 4-10-89). Fuggett's main 
message to the Iowa state legislators was-"the poison is in the dose", 
and that low levels of agricultural chemicals in groundwater are not 
dangerous to public health. 
Fuggett believes the groundwater conflict in Iowa had become so 
interlaced with politics and emotion that science took a backseat, and 
he also felt that his presentations were not given fair consideration 
by Iowa lawmakers. Fuggett and other chemical industry officials met 
with lawmakers on several occasions to discuss the bill. 
IFCA lobbying over HF-63l was criticized by some involved in the 
bill. Critics claimed the IFCA greatly exaggerated the regulatory 
provisions of the bill to gain support in defeating it. 
Representatives Sue Mullins, Janet Adams, and David Osterberg filed a 
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complaint with the House Ethics Committee against IFCA lobbyist Winton 
Etchin for sending a letter to his association claiming the Leopold 
Center was a study center for organic farming. Osterberg and Mullins 
are pro-"sustainable agriculture", a position which advocates the 
reduction, but not elimination of agricultural chemicals (Des Moines 
Re~ister 4-10-87). Etchin denies ever lying and defends the IFCA 
lobbying. "We only tried to sit down with the legislators and talk 
sense, but they were not listening" (Etchin 2-24-89). It is safe to 
say that the IFCA did consider the defeat of the bill to be very 
important and used much of their interest group resources to accomplish 
that goal. 
Iowa Farm Bureau Federation (IFBF) 
Possessing strong p~ysical resources and a wealth of experience in 
Iowa state politics, the Farm Bureau successfully lobbied the issue of 
farmers liability in the House and Senate. The Farm Bureau endorsed 
final passage of HF-63l, after the House had voted 99-0 to prote"ct 
farmers from liability claims. Efforts by the Farm Bureau to soften 
the bill's language in regard to agricultural drainage wells may have 
had some impact on that section of HF-63l. 
Farm Bureau spokesman Ted Yanochek notes IFBF lobbying efforts 
were instrumental in freeing up the oil-overcharge account funds to 
help lessen the cost of the bill to Iowa's agricultural sector 
(Yanochek 3-9-89). 
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It is clear that the IFBF and the IFCA were not in close 
cooperation in lobbying the groundwater bill. While the IFCA came out 
strongly to defeat the bill, the IFBF pursued a much more limited 
strategy of attempting to limit the expense to Iowa's farmers. After 
the main battle for this objective had been won, IFBF lobbyist withdrew 
from the debate and endorsed passage. As a large and diverse 
organization representing thousands of individual farmers, the IFBF saw 
protection of its constituents as its major goal in this round of 
groundwater protection legislation. 
Commodity Groups 
Iowa commodity groups did not strongly lobby for defeat or passage 
of HF-63l. Commodity groups spokesmen report that their organizations 
did monitor the bill and they participated in an informational network 
of concerned groups sharing educational information to better 
understand the technical aspects of the bill and the issue of 
groundwater contamination (James 5-2-89, Williamson 5-2-89, Larson 5-1-
89). 
Iowa Ex-al Groups 
Ex-a1 lobbying for HF-631 was done by a small number of self-
financed "volunteer" activists. Lacking a stable of full time 
lobbyists may have hurt the environmental lobby on the groundwater 
issue. 
Although Iowa environmental groups were able to dispatch a small 
number of lobbyists to the Statehouse to lobby in favor of their 
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objectives, they lacked the financial resources to match the direct 
lobbying effort of the chemical industry. 
The ex-al groups relied on indirect methods to influence the 
lawmakers. The Sierra Club and the Audubon Society concentrated on 
marshalling support at the "grassroots" level to pressure the 
legislature. Sierra Club literature urged its members to fight for the 
passage of the bill through the mobilization of their "human 
resources". Sierra Club members received "legislative alerts" 
explaining the importance of the bill and requested its members to 
contact their legislator. 
Environmental groups courted media attention with a press 
conference in mid-March explaining the importance of the bill in 
protecting groundwater. Izaak Walton League national president, Carl 
Br~tmul, an Iowa resident, feels his group may have had more influence 
in helping the DNR and the "key six" legislators with some technical 
expertise on the topic of groundwater pollution. Bratmul notes that 
Izaak Walton League members are prominent on advisory groups dealing 
with water pollution and helped provide technical expertise to 
proponents of groundwater legislation, including Groundwater Protection 
Bill author Paul Johnson (Bratmul 4-7-89). 
While the support of Iowa's ex-al groups was welcomed by the "key 
six", the lobbying effort by Iowa environmental groups was not 
considered crucial to the passage of HF-631. The environmental groups 
were helpful, but in Rep. Hatch's view, "the strength of it (the 
lobbying effort) came from the legislators themselves" (Hatch 3-3-89). 
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Ralph Rosenberg felt the "key six" were able to use staff work to 
develop their own lobbying expertise on the issue (Rosenberg 4-7-89). 
Why HF-631 Passed 
In retrospect, all four of the "key six" legislators felt that HF-
631 was passed into law with most of its key provisions intact. A few 
points may have been lost in the political process but the legislators 
express satisfaction with the results. 
It is probably not accurate to credit any argument or any single 
reason for the passage of the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act. The 
passage of this legislation is due to a mixture of several factors, 
whose influence this chapter will attempt to explain. 
Public Opinion 
The strongest explanation given by many observers was public 
opinion. Ralph Rosenberg states that groundwater purity "is a mom and 
apple pie issue, right up there with the American flag" (Rosenberg 4-7-
89). Four of the five po~ls taken on the issue of groundwater showed a 
strong majority favoring groundwater protection (Hoyer 1987). Iowa DNR 
official George Hallburg states that the main driving force behind the 
bill was public opinion, and from his vantage point, "it was obvious 
many legislators were hearing from home on this issue and did not want 
to go home without having done something positive on the groundwater 
problem" (Hallberg 4-10-89). Hallberg strongly asserts public opinion 
was "overwhelmingly" in favor of the bill. Hallberg also notes the 
response that the DNR received at hearings that were 
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held in 1985 and 1986 that gauged public concern over the groundwater 
contamination issue. 
A study of the DNR of public opinion on the groundwater 
contamination issue produced results that strongly support Hallburg's 
assertion. When Iowans were asked how serious they considered the 
problem of groundwater pollution to be, 44 percent responded "very 
serious", 42 percent "somewhat serious" with only 11 percent answering 
that it is a "minor problem". Of these sampled, 63 percent volunteered 
"agricultural chemicals" as the main source of groundwater pollution in 
Iowa. Eight-three percent of those sampled wished to see the state 
take stronger action on the problem of groundwater pollution 
(Environmental Protection Commission 1987). There was less support for 
a more regulatory approach in this survey with only 36 percent 
supporting tighter restrictions on farm pesticides. No proposed regu-
latory solution gained a majority of affirmative votes in this study. 
Public opinion, as sampled by this survey in 1987, seemed to support 
the objectives of the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act, while preferring 
non-regulatory solutions. The bill acknowledges this posi- tion by 
granting there is a problem with agricultural chemicals in Iowa's 
groundwater, and moving to address it in a mostly nonregulatory manner. 
Dick.Frieberg, an IFCA member and fertilizer dealer in rural 
Fairfield, expressed a belief that rural Iowans have a very strong 
sentiment that their water should be pure as possible and were not very 
receptive to suggestions that minimal amounts of contamination were 
within a margin of safety (Frieberg 4-24-89). 
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Even critics of the legislation admit that the public was probably 
pro-groundwater bill, but assert that uneven treatment from the media 
may have been a contributing factor to public opinion. Winton Etchin 
of the IFCA said public opinion was shaped by "misinformation 
circulated by certain people and printed as gospel in the media" 
(Etchin 2-24-89). Dr. Fuggett of the National Agricultural Chemicals 
Association, expressed concern that "the public at large is not well-
educated on the topic and is unduly alarmed about groundwater 
pollution. With this strong sense of alarm over the topic, Fuggett 
felt that the public was incapable of looking at the issue objectively_ 
"If they don't want something in their groundwater, they don't want 
something in their groundwater" (Fuggett 4-10-89). 
Media attention to the issue helped focus public attention on the 
issue and increase the pressure on the legislature to pass protective 
legislation. IFCA president Larry Thompson thinks the issue may not 
have risen to the policy forefront if "The Des Moines Register had not 
taken the issue under its wing" (Thompson 4-10-89). The Register 
raised concern on the groundwater pollution program with a five part 
series of articles in early 1986, and published several editorials 
supporting groundwater protection legislation. A great majority of the 
parties concerned with HF-63l consider public opinion to be the most 
crucial factor in the bill's passage. 
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A Backlash Against IFCA Lobbying 
The lack of success that the chemical lobby had in defeating the 
bill might suggest a backlash against IFCA lobbying. The IFCA's strong 
and vociferous opposition to the bill, pressure tactics, and 
utilization of outside lobbyists has received strong criticism from 
many observers and could have hurt the IFCA efforts to defeat the bill. 
Dave Larson of the Iowa Soybean Association thinks the IFCA's 
utilization of lobbyists from outside Iowa hurt their credibility in 
trying to defeat the bill in the Iowa State legislature (Larson 5-1-
89). A number of the "key six" legislators expressed strong criticism, 
not only for its intent, but also for the way it was carried out. 
Representative Jack Hatch claimed the IFCA lobbying was "amateurish" 
and "the IFCA just sent people up here to speak against the bill 
without adequate information, so they could easily be discounted" 
(Hatch 3-3-89). Sue Mullins called the effort "sleazy", and asserted 
that the main IFCA lobbyist deliberately lied and misled their dealers 
about the contents of the bill. "It was one of the few times I have 
seen a lobbyist lie, and legislators do not take that too well" 
(Mullins 4-13-89). 
Representative David Osterberg suggested the strong IFCA lobbying 
effort backfired against the bill with regard to public opinion: "The 
people saw a strong bill going through the legislative process, and saw 
that those who were trying desperately to defeat it were those who were 
making the most money from the sale of more and more chemicals" 
(Osterberg 2-24-89). Osterberg asserts that the IFCA has made itself 
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"the-most untrustworthy group in Iowa by continuing to deny that there 
was a problem" (Osterberg 2-24-89). 
Even 1987 IFCA president iarry Thompson, who had a strong role in 
mapping the IFCA lobbying effort, expresses some regret about the 
strategy and wishes the IFCA could have used a more information 
oriented approach. If Thompson had the chance to lobby HF-63l again, 
he said the IFCA would be more likely to bring in more scientists to 
educate the legislators on the issue rather than lobbyists and dealers 
to apply pressure to individual ~egislators (Thompson 4-10-89). It 
seems clear that IFCA lobbying efforts were by no means effective in 
defeating HF-63l. 
The Issue Specific Nature of the Iowa Farm Lobby 
This made a united effort impossible for opponents of HF-631. 
Each component of the agricultural business sector had its own 
objectives in the lobbying effort, and there was little cooperation and 
coordination. Spokesmen for the soybean, corn, and cattlemen 
associations all assert that they usually limit themselves to issues 
that directly influence their industry, and they felt that the 
Groundwater Bill was not considered a major threat to their well-being. 
1987 IFCA President Larry Thompson feels that the rest of the Iowa farm 
lobby was not active or supportive of the IFCA's attempt to defeat the 
bill: "It was us out· lobbying against the bill and everyone else has a 
real hands-off approach" (Thompson 4-10-89). 
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The bill would have added some extra expense to all sectors of the 
local farm economy and the degree of opposition varied with the degree 
of new taxes or regulations imposed. Most militant in opposition to 
the bill was the IFCA, while the Farm Bureau and Commodity groups 
lobbied a few specific points of concern to them. When the bill 
finally came to a vote, Winton Etchin of the IFCA notes, "In the last 
closing days of the legislature, it was us against the world and we did 
not come out looking too good" (Etchin 2-24-89). 
Perhaps the differing segments of the farm lobby did not have a 
coincidence of interest. As commodity group representatives have 
suggested, the producer groups feel a strong need to preserve their 
production resources of land and water, something input organizations 
like the IFCA may not consider as important (Larson 5-1-89). 
George Hallberg of the DNR suggests the agricultural industry. may 
be "the new boys on the block when it comes to regulation" and their 
inexperience may have been a factor in the lack of success in lobbying 
HF-63l (Hallberg 4-10-89). Thompson and Etchin both foresee the 
producer organizations and the Farm Bureau moving into more active 
opposition to groundwater legislation as the future bills become more 
regulatory. 
Passage of HF-63l may have been aided in the political process by 
the legislative actions of the "key six". The "key six" legislators 
have been seen by observers as having expertise on the issue and 
persuasiveness ·in their arguments for passage. Larry Thompson suggests 
that most legislators were not knowledgeable on the issue of 
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groundwater pollution, related well to the "key six" legislators, and 
were easily swayed by the "key six" legislators' ·appearance of 
technical expertise on the issue (Thompson 4-10-89). The support of 
powerful House Speaker Don Avenson was helpful in gaining the suppo.rt 
of a majority of the House and Senate. Partisan consideration may be 
factored in because the authors of the groundwater bill were mostly 
Democrats, and the Iowa Democratic party holds a majority in the House 
of Representatives. 
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CHAPTER 10. THE FUTURE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
GROUNDWATER PROTECTION ACT 
The passage of HF-63l was merely the beginning of the "road for 
groundwater protection in Iowa. HF-63l, by its research-oriented, 
nonregulatory nature, leaves much room in the future for embellishment. 
The issue of standards is unresolved, and it is still a point of 
contention in 1989. Hearings held in 1988 brought veterans of HF-63l 
into the policy arena once again. Environmentalists are again hoping 
for non-degradation while the chemical lobby is hoping for the 
imposition of EPA standards, which are considered much more lenient 
than most state standards. 
Yanochek of the Farm Bureau is critical of recent groundwater 
protection proposals, and is concerned that the state may be shifting 
to a more regulatory approach. The state does seem to be focusing on 
the regulation of one chemical, Atrazine. Atrazine is believed to have 
the greatest potential for causing cancer of the agricultural chemicals 
used in Iowa. 
Chemical industry officials believe that as future research is 
conducted, the results will vindicate agricultural chemicals as not 
being a major source of groundwater contamination. Dr. Fawcett thinks 
the focus on atrazine shows that the state is backing away from its 
emphasis on trying to regulate all fertilizers and chemicals. Industry 
officials hope the state will begin a statewide groundwater monitoring 
plan that they feel will identify more serious sources of 
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contamination, like industrial solvents and private septic systems 
(Etchin 2-24-89, Thompson 4-10-89, Frieberg 4-24-89). 
The "key six" legislators and the main environmental groups 
clearly do not consider the battle for groundwater protection to be 
over. The Iowa General Assembly moved in '88 and '89 to deal with 
polluted surface water with a plan for filter strips around streams and 
rivers. Proponents of HF-63l note that many who opposed the 
groundwater bill are now pleased with the results. The "key six" 
legislators all express satisfaction with the implementation of the 
bill. The legislators do not rule out the prospect of much more 
regulatory legislation in the future. Ralph Rosenberg feels that HF-
631 merely created the apparatus for dealing with groundwater pollution 
in the future. 
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CHAPTER 11. THE "KEY SIX" ELECTION RACES 
One of a lobbyist's key levers in influencing an elected official 
is the promise to help him or her retain the seat in the next election, 
or the threat to work for the legislator's defeat. 
All of the "key six" legislators seats were up for election in 
1988, and the strong stand they took on the groundwater bill would have 
some impact on their re-election campaigns. 
Interest groups have two major resources in influencing the 
outcomes of elections, one resource is the contribution of campaign 
funds, and the other is contribution by group members of time and 
effort to an election campaign (Ornstein and Elder 1978, 70-73). 
Iowa's interest group participation in the 1988 House of 
Representatives varied from group to group, as certain groups came out 
strongly in supporting candidates, and other groups observed a firm 
principle of nonparticipation in elections. Still other interest 
groups were limited in their ability to influence elections by lack of 
financial resources or by a lack of organizational skills. 
The most significant interest group activity in the 1988 house 
elections was the decision by the IFCA to actively try to defeat the 
"key six" legislators. This chapter will describe the role interest 
groups may have had in the "key six" contests. 
Activities of Iowa ex-al groups The Izaak Walton League and 
the Iowa Audubon-Council do not endorse candidates or take part in 
elections. Members of these groups may have taken part in the "key 
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six" election races but on a strictly unofficial basis. Audubon 
activist Cindy Hildebrand endorsed Rep. Ralph Rosenberg for re-
election. Discussions with Hildebrand and Walton League President 
Bratmul suggest that many of their members are supportive of the "key 
six" legislators, but there was no concerted effort by members of these 
two groups to help them win re-election. 
Sierra Club chapters were more active in trying to influence the 
"key six" races. Sue Mullins reports that Club members provided time 
and effort in her campaign. Chris Robbins of the Sierra Club said that 
some Sierra Club chapters sent out literature supporting the re-
election of "key six" legislators and that some chapters made official 
endorsements of some of the "key six". Robbins reported the effort was 
not co-ordinated across the state, and that each chapter was acting on 
its own behalf. Robbins said that no Sierra Club funds went to re-
election campaigns, as the organizations do not have the financial 
resources to contribute. 
Robbins also suggests that candidates wish to play down support 
from environmental .groups. The activities of many environmental groups 
are somewhat controversial and candidates often wish to keep from being 
associated publicly with certain environmentalist groups. 
Agricultural Business Groups 
Iowa Farm Bureau Federation With a campaign war chest of 124 
thousand dollars (see Appendix B) the IFBF was one of the major PAC 
contributors in Iowa. IFBF spokesman Ted Yanochek denied the 
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Groundwater Bill was a major issue in influencing IFBF contributions or 
endorsements. However, the IFBF did contribute substantial funds to 
many of the challengers to the "key six". Generally Farm Bureau 
contributions are given to Republican candidates, and the contributions 
to the challengers to the "key six" do not seem excessive in comparison 
to IFBF contributions to Republican candidates statewide. No IFBF 
contributions went to the "key six" including Sue Mullins, a 
Republican. It seems apparent that while the IFBF did not strongly 
oppose the passage of the groundwater bill, their campaign 
contributions suggest they would be pleased if the "key six" proponents 
of the bill were.defeated and replaced by candidates the IFBF finds 
more friendly to IFBF interests. 
Iowa Fertilizer and Chemical Association Just as the IFCA was 
the most active of Iowa's special interests in lobbying the bill, the 
organization was also quite active in the 1988 election. The IFCA 
worked to defeat each of the "key six" by giving early support to 
prospective opponents of the "key six", including direct financial 
contributions and contributions of rFCA personnel to opposition 
campaigns. 
Ex-IFCA President Larry Thompson described the 1988 rFCA election 
effort as (1) Working with the Republican Party to find prospective 
opponents to the "key six", (2) educating them on the groundwater 
issue, (3) providing financial assistance with direct IFCA financial 
contributions, and (4) encouraging individual fertilizer dealers to 
contribute time and money 'to these candidates' campaigns. 
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The IFCA contributed 500 dollars to the campaigns of three 
challengers, as follows: to the campaigns of Charles Hurley of Fayette 
who ran against House speaker Don Avenson, Tom Deerburg who opposed 
Representative David Osterberg, and Robert Christianson of Humboldt, 
who defeated Sue Mullins. The three other opposition candidates 
refused IFCA financial contributions. It is harder to estimate the 
financial contributions of individual fertilizer dealers, as the Iowa 
Election Commission records do not specify contributions from private 
citizens. Ex-IFCA president Larry Thompson estimates that 25-30 
percent of the IFCA membership was active in trying to influence the 
1988 house and senate elections (Thompson 4-10-89). 
Winton Etchin of the IFCA, denies creating a "hit list" and he saw 
the IFCA's role in this campaign as no different than the PAC 
contributions of other interest groups. Etchin said that the IFCA 
realized the difficulty of defeating incumbent legislators and asserts 
the objectives of this campaign were merely to "keep them at home and 
keep them campaigning ... " (Etchin 2-24-89). Rep. Osterberg asserted 
the IFCA lobbying was based on "scaring legislators into thinking that 
if they supported the groundwater bill, they would lose the next 
election" (Osterberg 2-24-89), so perhaps the IFCA wished to show they 
could inflict some damage on the political fortunes of those who had 
supported groundwater protection legislation. A successful campaign to 
defeat the "key six" could not only have removed strong protagonists of 
groundwater legislation, but also could have served as a warning to 
others considering supporting future legislation. 
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The IFCA campaign definitely suffered a low success rate, as five 
of the six legislators were re-e.1ected to another term. Furthermore, a 
comparison of the 1986 and 1988 races show little difference in the 
electoral fortunes of Rosenberg, Hatch, and Johnson. The other three 
of the big six did have greater difficulty in 1988, with Osterberg 
facing an opponent for the first time in four years and Don Avenson 
having his margin of victory narrowed considerably. Only Sue Mullins, 
the lone Republican among the "key six", lost her re-election bid. 
Ralph Rosenberg and Jack Hatch say they used the IFCA opposition to 
their advantage, and that the opposition from opponents of the 
groundwater bill was a plus in their campaigns. 
While the IFCA campaign effort was unsuccessful in defeating 
individual legislators, it did have some limited success in imposing a 
political burden on several of the "key six" legislators. Rep. David 
Osterberg felt he would not have had a well-financed opponent without 
the campaign of the IFCA and the rest of the agricultural lobby's 
opposition to his re-election. 
A comparison of the "key six" re-election races with six other 
House races involving incumbent Democrats chosen at random suggests 
that the opponents to the "key six" were definitely better financed 
than other Republican challengers (Table 2 and Appendix A). The 
challengers to the "key six" received large contributions from Farm 
Bureau and three received substantial direct contributions from the 
IFCA. A direct link with the groundwater bill would be very difficult 
to prove, as undoubtedly other issues may have influenced this figure. 
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Yet early IFCA funding may have enabled three of the opponents to the 
"key six" to launch credible campaigns which attracted support from 
other PACs and private citizens. It is also difficult to trace the 
amount of financial support that the opposition candidates may have 
received from individual fertilizer dealers. Rep. David Osterberg 
suggested much of the fertilizer industry contributions to his 
opponents may have been "laundered" .to avoid negative publicity. 
In retrospect, it is hard to see how a "hit list" to defeat 
incumbent legislators could have worked. The IFCA lacked the financial 
ability to bankroll this sort of activity. Says Etchin, "We are a 
small PAC, when you have Farm Bureau out there with 100,000 dollars, 
our 10,000 dollars doesn't cut a lot of ice" (Etchin 2-24-89). The 
IFCA.could have provided the "seed money" for an opposition campaign to 
grow and attract other sources of support, but even that would be 
offset by the benefits of incumbency and support from PACs and interest 
groups traditionally friendly to the Iowa Democratic Party. 
The Races 
Table 2 clearly shows that the campaigns to defeat the incumbent 
"six" did attract considerable financial support from private donors 
and established PACs with ties to the Republican Party. A comparison 
of the "key six" opponents with six other Republican challengers 
suggests the "key six" campaigns received greater financial support 
than the other Republican challengers. The challengers often outspent 
the incumbent "six", but the incumbents seem to have an edge in 
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contributions from PACs. The races seem partisan contents with 
Republican candidates receiving funds from business PACs and the 
National Rifle Association, Taxpayers United and Democrats countering 
with money from the major labor unions. 
This typical pattern is best demonstrated in the race for the 28th 
district between House. Speaker Don Avenson and Republican challenger 
Charles Hurley. Several residents of Don Avenson's district assert 
that PACs generally shied away from opposing Avenson, who holds the 
powerful "gate-keeper" role in the Iowa House, deciding what 
legislation will reach the floor. Few PACs would risk offending a 
powerful legislator like Avenson, who outspent Hurley by a wide margin. 
Observers of Avenson's battle for re-election against IFCA-
financed Charles Hurley of Fayette felt that the contest turned on 
traditional urban-rural issues, with Avenson winning the blue-collar 
vote in the city of Oelwein, and Hurley receiving a majority in the 
rural areas. 
Harold Brinkman of Nevada, who opposed Ralph Rosenberg, asserted 
the IFCA took a strong interest in his campaign, but he did not take 
any campaign funds from the IFCA. Both Rosenberg and Brinkman deny 
that the groundwater bill was a factor in the election. The population 
of the district is largely nonagricultural as the main employer is. Iowa 
State University in Ames. 
Jack Hatch stated that the IFCA campaign helped him in his urban 
Des Moines district. Hatch called attention to the IFCA "targeting" in 
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his campaign literature. However his opponent, Mike Conley, did not 
accept IFCA campaign contributions. 
David Osterberg felt he paid a political price for his groundwater 
activism, facing a well-financed opponent in Tom Deerburg of Tipton. 
"I earned a strong opponent who spent three times as much as my last 
one." Osterberg concedes having to campaign more and winning by a 
smaller margin (Osterberg 2-24-89). Jack Hatch thinks Osterberg and 
Johnson paid a heavy political price in their largely rural districts 
because "their opponents may not have necessarily spoke out against 
their stand on the groundwater bill, but suddenly their opponents began 
to infer that they were anti-agricultural, anti-rural, anti~farmer, and 
anti-Iowa" (Hatch 3-3-89). Both Johnson and Osterberg retained their 
seats by a comfortable margin. 
The only "key six" casualty of the 1988 election, Sue Mullins, 
denies that her support for the groundwater bill was the major cause of 
her losing the primary race for the Republican nomination to Robert 
Christianson of Humboldt. Mullins notes that she won Pocahontas 
County, which had the most agricultural drainage wells and the worst 
groundwater contamination problem in her district. She does feel the 
IFCA played a role in her campaign by heavily financing Robert 
Christianson. Mullins attributes her defeat to apathy among many 
Republicans in the 15th district. Conservative Christianson suggests 
Mullins, a strong advocate of abortion rights, was much too liberal for 
her constituency, and the groundwater bill was just one of many issues 
that hurt her re-election bid (Christianson 3-30-89). Christianson 
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lost in the general election by a wide margin to Democrat Dolores Mertz 
of Humboldt. 
Election results suggest the IFCA efforts had a very limited 
affect on the electoral fate of the "key six". Perhaps a political 
price was exacted by making certain "key six" legislators work much 
harder for their re-election and possibly facilitating in the defeat of 
Sue Mullins. However, five of the six legislators have survived and 
are currently spearheading the drive for stren~thened groundwater 
legislation. If the IFCA hoped to deter these legislators from this 
goal, it certainly did not achieve this objective. 
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CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSIONS 
The battle over the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act provides 
insight into the workings of interest groups and the policy process of 
environmental politics. 
The actions of the IFCA support Truman's "proliferation 
hypothesis." Truman had $uggested the growing complexity of the 
American economy has stimulated interest group activity by the newly 
specialized and differentiated segments of American society. The IFCA 
is one of these interest groups, occupying a niche in the agricultural 
economy that was created by the massive mechanization and 
specialization of American farming in the past century. Motivated by 
the material benefits of continued sale of agricultural chemicals, the 
IFCA lobbied hard to defeat legislation which they considered to be 
focused on eliminating their place in the agricultural economy. 
What does seem atypical in the light of the materials reviewed on 
lobbying is the aggressive IFCA campaign to defeat the incumbent "key 
six". This risky strategy· is not undertaken by many lobbyists, as 
Jeffrey Berry and other political scientists have noted. 
The inability of the Iowa farm lobby to reach a consensus on HF-
631 could be construed as evidence of the issue-specific nature of 
agricultural interest groups suggested by Browne. It seems apparent 
that the only agricultural interest taking a nonissue-specific "big 
picture" approach to Iowa agricultural issue was the IFBF, and they did 
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not feel the need to ally themselves with the main opponent of HF-631, 
the IFCA. 
In support of passage of HF-63l, Iowa ex-al groups function in 
many ways described by Hadwiger and Browne. The ex-al groups saw the 
1985 and 1986 and the exposure given these findings by the media -as 
creating the "policy window" needed to influence the legislature. The 
groups concentrated on the marshalling of "grassr90ts" support through 
directing media attention, such as the mid-March press conference of 
Iowa environmentalists. 
However, the main push for groundwater protection legislation in 
Iowa came from within the policy process. The ex-al groups functioned 
as "cheerleaders" to a group of eiwironmentally-oriented legislators. 
These lawmakers' motivations seem to span back two decades to the 
halcyon days of the environmentalist movement noted by Rosenbaum. 
Supported by public opinion in favor of groundwater protection, Iowa 
lawmakers were able to implement environmental protection legislation 
without strong support from the ex-al coalition. 
Environmental policy concerns have reached a level of crucial 
importance in the past few years. Groundwater contamination is one of 
a number of pressing environmental problems that threaten to seriously 
harm the quality of life on this planet. In the year following the 
passage of the Iowa Groundwater Protection Act, the state endured 
severe drought and extreme heat, conditions that some scientists link 
to a pattern of global warming brought on by the emission of carbon-
dioxide from cars and factories. 
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Our society will be severely challenged by these conditions. 
Actions needed to deal with environmental degradation will not be 
inexpensive. Some activities of mankind will have to be curtailed and 
alternatives found. 
Policy decisions may involve the assignment of costs to certain 
segments of society. This case study suggests that interest groups 
wishing to influence government deci~ions about the assignment of the 
expense for environmental protection must rely on the presentation of 
scientific data to both the lawmakers and the general public. The 
strongest force behind the passage of HF-631 was the fact that Iowans 
were convinced there was a problem with the purity of their groundwater 
and that something should be done to deal with this problem. 
Direct IFCA pressure tactics, such as packing the statehouse with 
IFCA members or conducting a campaign to defeat the main proponents of 
the bill, were not successful in influencing state policy on 
groundwater. 
A different IFCA strategy using more research presentation, such 
as the one suggested by ex-IFCA President Larry Thompson, may have been 
more effective in winning the support of the general public and state 
legislators, and it may have also coaxed the other agricultural 
interest groups into a more active stance. The need for information 
based lobbying stressed by Milbraith and Berry seems to have been of 
crucial importance in this instance. 
What has been suggested by everyone involved in the struggle over 
HF-631 is the need for more study of the groundwater problem. 
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Differences might have been expressed over the direction of this 
research, but no one denied there may be a problem with Iowa 
groundwater. The groundwater bill's research and educational 
provisions are needed to discover the depth of the problem and how best 
to impose the costs of dealing with it. 
Iowa has begun to deal with its groundwater problem, and many 
other states are working on groundwater protection strategies and 
legislation. As so many Americans rely upon groundwater for their 
drinking water and so many other important functions, the protection of 
its purity is an urgent policy iss~e. Studies of the policy arena of 
environmental politics will surely be crucial for the understanding of 
American politics well into the next century. 
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Table 1. A comparison of 1986 and 1988 legislative races for the 
major proponents of the bill 
Counties 
Humboldt 
Kossuth 
Palo Alto 
Pocahontas 
Totals 
Counties 
Humboldt 
Kossuth 
Palo Alto 
Pocahontas 
Totals 
Counties 
Chickasaw 
Fayette 
Totals 
1988 State Representative District 15 
Democrat 
Dolores Mertz 
Republican 
Bob Christianson 
3,060 
3,287 
517 
620 
7,484 
1986 State Representative District 15 
Republican 
Sue Mullins 
2,664 
2,138 
323 
552 
5,677 
1988 State Representative District 28 
Democrat 
Donald Avenson 
711 
5,425 
6,136 
2,177 
1,747 
202 
430 
4,566 
1 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Republican 
Charles Hurley 
610 
4,735 
5,345 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
1986 State Representative District 28 
Democrat Republican 
Counties Donald Avenson John Block 
Chickasaw 915 411 
Fayette 5,113 2,777 
Totals 6,028 3,188 
1986 State Representative District 31 
Democrat Republican 
Counties Paul Johnson Wayne Walter 
Allainakee 1,321 1",439 
Winnesheik 5,464 3,106 
Totals 6,785 4,545 
1986 State Representative 'District 31 
Democrat Republican 
Counties Paul Johnson Gene Sivesind 
Allamakee 1,150 1,290 
Winnesheik 3,693 2,171 
Totals 4,843 3,461 
1988 State Representative District 43 
Democrat Republican 
Counties David Osterberg Wayne Deerburg 
Cedar 3,178 3,743 
Linn 3,845 1,934 
Totals 7,023 5,677 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
1986 State Representative District 43 
Democrat 
Counties David Osterberg SC 
Cedar 3,380 34 
Linn 3,088 18 
Totals 5,468 52 
1988 State Representative District 73 
Democrat Republican 
Counties Ralph Rosenberg Harold Brinkman 
Story 7,622 4,905 
1986 State Representative District 73 
Democrat Republican 
Counties Ralph Rosenberg Tracy Rector 
Story 5,812 3,654 
1988 State Representative District 81 
Democrat Republican 
Counties Jack Hatch Tom Conley 
Polk 7,035 4,852 
1986 State Representative District 81 
Democrat Republican 
Counties Jack Hatch Jon Narcisse 
Polk 5,203 .3,193 
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Table 2. Major PAC contributions and total contribution figures 
for the key six legislative contests 
Sue Mullins (primary only) 
Contributor 
Woman's Campaign FD 
Help Encourage 
Legis. Process 
Totals 
Don Avenson 
Contributor 
Construction Ind. 
United Auto Workers 
Iowa Bankers 
Northwestern Bell 
Iowa Savings & Loan 
AFSCME 
Totals 
David Osterberg 
Contributor 
Iowa Education Assoc. 
H.E.L.P. 
United Auto Workers 
AFSCME 
Iowa Medical 
Totals 
Amount 
750 
500 
5,902 
Amount 
1,400 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
645 
31,459 
Amount 
800 
500 
500 
400-
400 
16,242 
Contributor 
Iowa Industries 
IFCA 
May tag Corp. 
Taxpayers United 
Iowa Realtors 
Contributor 
IFBF 
IFCA 
May tag Corp. 
Contributor 
Iowa Industries 
IFBF 
IFCA 
Hawkeye Bancorp. 
Lincoln Club 
Nat. Rifle Assoc. 
Bob Christianson 
Amount 
2,000 
500 
250 
250 
100 
25,391 
Charles Hurley 
Amount 
1,100 
500 
200 
24,386 
Tom Deerberg 
Amount 
2,250 
1,500 
500 
400 
400 
250 
23,191 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Ralph Rosenberg 
Contributor 
Construct. Ind. 
Iowa Bankers 
Iowa Legal 
AFSCME 
Iowa Realtors 
Amount 
500 
350 
500 
250 
250 
Totals 14,438 
Paul Johnson 
Contributor 
Iowa Electric 
Total.s 
Jack Hatch 
Contributor 
United Auto Workers 
AFL-CIO 
Construction Ind. 
CentralIA Builders 
Coastal Co. Employees 
Iowa Bankers 
AFSCME 
Amount 
750 
8,948 
Amount 
5,000 
2,500 
400 
350 
300 
250 
250 
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Contributor 
IFBF 
Iowa Industry 
Taxpayers United 
Contributor 
Iowa Industries 
IFBF 
Contributor 
Lincoln Club 
EMC Corp. 
Harold Brinkman 
Amount 
750 
250 
500 
15,881 
Wayne Walter 
Amount 
1,250 
1,000 
25,596 
Tom Conley 
Amount 
200 
100 
Note: Tom Conleys' financial disclosure for the 1988 campaign year is 
still incomplete as of May 9, 1989, so a comparison and analysis 
of this race is impossible. 
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APPENDIX A. SIX HOUSE RACES INVOLVING INCUMBENT DEMOCRATS 
PAC CONTRIBUTIO~S AND FINAL VOTE TOTALS 
State Representative District 63 
Daniel Jay 6,483 S. A. Wueschner 3,900 
H.E.L.P. 1,500 Nat. Rifle Assoc. 200 
AFSCME 550 
Education Assoc. 400 
Iowa Bankers 500 
United Auto Workers 300 
Construction Ind. 250 
Total Funds $13,545 2,095 
State Representative District 18 
Robert Fuller 5,977 Clark McNeil 5,513 
Education Assoc. 800 Taxpayers Unit. 3,300 
United Auto Workers 800 Construction Ind. 800 
IFBF 700 Nat. Rifle Assoc. 500 
AFSCME 500 John Deere Corp. 500 
Iowa Law 500 
Totals $14,659 21,372 
State Representative District 12 
Josephine Gruhn 6,735 Ruth Peltzer 4,787 
Iowa Law 700 Taxpayers United 700 
Education Assoc. 400 Lincoln Club . 300 
Iowa Bankers 400 
United Auto Workers 300 
AFSCME 200 
Totals $8,090 5,661 
State 
David Schrader 7,491 
H.E.L.P. 1,500 
Education Assoc. 800 
United Auto Workers 700 
Iowa Medical 280 
Education Assoc. 800 
United. Auto Workers 700 
Totals $14,371 
State 
Janet Adams 6,080 
Education Assoc. 1,000 
United Auto Workers 700 
ASCME 500 
H.E.L.P. 500 
Iowa Medical 300 
AFL-CIO 250 
Totals $20,986 
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Representative 
Representative 
District 69 
Leonard Gosse1ink 
Iowa Industries 
Taxpayers United 
Employees Rights 
(right to work) 
Taxpayers United 
(right to work) 
Construction Ind. 
District 14 
Kirk Leeds 
Iowa Industries 
Construction Ind. 
IFBF 
Employee Rights 
4,790 
1,250 
800 
700 
800 
400 
22,075 
5,128 
1,250 
750 
700 
500 
21,600 
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APPENDIX B. 1988 PAC EXPENDITURES 
1. Taxpayers United 
2. Iowa Farm Bureau Federation 
3. Construction Industry 
4. Help Encourage Legislative Process 
5. Iowa Law 
6. Iowa Medical 
7. Iowa State Education Association 
8. Iowa State United Auto Workers 
9. Lincoln Club 
10. Iowa Industrys 
11. Realtors 
12. Iowa Bankers 
13. Linn Eagles 
$166,053 
122,144 
94,278 
82,676 
80,343 
80,177 
59,986 
58,400 
57,528 
53,126 
.50,391 
42,242 
41,042 
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INTERVIEWS 
Mr. Dale Bratmul, President of the Izaak Walton League, Ames, Iowa, 7 
April 1989. 
Mr. Harold Brinkman, 1988, Candidate for state representative, Nevada, 
Iowa, 6 April 1989. 
Mr. Robert Christianson, 1988, Candidate for state representative, 
Humboldt, Iowa, 3 March 1989. 
Mr. Winton Etchin of the Iowa Fertilizer and Chemical Association, Des 
Moines, Iowa, 24 February 1989. 
Dr. Richard Fawcett, Dept. of Entomology, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa, 3 March 1989. 
Mr. Dick Frieberg, of the Iowa Fertilizer and Chemical Association, 
Fairfield, Iowa, 24 April 1989. 
Dr. Robert Fuggett of National Agricultural Chemicals, interview by 
author, Wilmington, Delaware, 10 April 1989. 
Dr. George Hallberg, of the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Iowa 
City, Iowa, 10 April 1989. 
Representative Jack Hatch, Des Moines, Iowa, 3 March 1989. 
Ms. Cyndi Hildebrand, of the Iowa Audubon Council, Des Moines, Iowa, 4 
April 1989. 
Mr. Myron James, of the Iowa Cattlemen's Association, Ames, Iowa, 2 May 
1989. 
Mr. David Larson, of the Iowa Soybean Council, Des Moines, Iowa, 1 May 
1989. 
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Mr. Daryl Maca1ester, of ·the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, 
Des Moines, Iowa, 2 February 1989. 
Ms. Sue Mullins, former Iowa State Representative, Corwith, Iowa, 13 
April 1989. 
Representative David Osterberg, interview by author, Des Moines, Iowa, 
24 February 1989. 
Ms. Chris Robbins, of the Sierra Club, Cedar Falls, Iowa, 13 April 
1989. 
Representative Ralph Rosenberg, Des Moines, Iowa, 7 April 1989. 
Mr. Larry Thompson, of the Iowa Fertilizer and Chemical Association, 
Jefferson, Iowa, 10 April 1989. 
Mr. Rodney Williamson, of the Iowa Corngrower's Association, Des 
Moines, Iowa, 2 May 1989. 
Mr .. Ted Yanochek, of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, Des Moines, Iowa, 
9 March 1989. 
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